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—“Is it essential to your case that we recognize 
Puerto Rico as a sovereign?”  
—“It is not essential that you recognize Puerto 
Rico as a sovereign with a capital ‘S’.”1 
 
The United States Supreme Court’s October 2015 Term 
will go down in history as the most significant one for Puerto 
Rico-United States relations in more than a century.  By opting 
to address the issues presented in Puerto Rico v. Sánchez 
Valle, a constitutional case arising from the Commonwealth 
courts, and Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free 
Trust, a statutory case arising from the United States District 
Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the answer to which 
directly related to one’s understanding of the nature of the 
political status between Puerto Rico and the United States, the 
United States Supreme Court set in motion a series of 
unprecedented actions by the Commonwealth government, the 
President, Congress, Commonwealth and federal judges, and 
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1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 
136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016) (No. 15-108).  
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civil society in general—both in San Juan and Washington, 
D.C.—that illustrate, now more clearly than ever, why Puerto 
Rico legally remains a 21st century colony of the United States.  
 
Part II of this Article will discuss Puerto Rico v. 
Sánchez Valle, setting forth the underlying facts of the case, 
the legal issues presented, what Puerto Rico courts held, and 
what the United States Supreme Court ultimately decided.  
Part III will focus on Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax 
Free Trust, following the same basic structure.  Part IV will 
illustrate how both cases reveal unequivocally that the United 
States’ legal treatment of Puerto Rico amounts to pure 
colonialism.  Finally, Part V will conclude by analyzing 
whether the Supreme Court of the United States can, or 
should, take action to fix this reality. 
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“This is the most important case on the constitutional 
relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States since 
the establishment of the Commonwealth in 1952.”2  So began 
the petition for writ of certiorari that the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico filed before the Supreme Court of the United 
States in July 2015 in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Luis 
M. Sánchez Valle to decide whether the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico and the federal government are separate 
sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
United States Constitution.  Just one month later, Puerto Rico 
asked the Court to review a second case, Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, to decide 
whether Chapter 9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code preempts 
a Puerto Rico statute creating a mechanism for the 
Commonwealth’s public utilities to restructure their debts, 
this time stating that “[t]his case involves Puerto Rico’s ability 
to respond to the most acute fiscal crisis in its history.”3  
Indeed, if Sánchez Valle is the most important case on the 
constitutional relationship between Puerto Rico and the 
United States, then Franklin California Tax-Free Trust may 
very well be the most important case on the statutory 
relationship between them.  Uncharacteristically, the Court 
granted both petitions, projecting the October 2015 Term as 
the most significant one for Puerto Rico in more than a 
century.4 
 
2 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 
136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016) (No. 15-108). 
3 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. 
Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (No. 15-233). 
4 In March 2016, the Court granted certiorari in a third case arising 
from Puerto Rico, this time a federal criminal prosecution.  In Bravo-
Fernández v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1491 (2016) (No. 15-537), a 
unanimous Court held that the the collateral estoppel prong of the Double 
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Since the Commonwealth’s creation in 1952, Puerto 
Ricans have been deeply divided as to what the nature of the 
relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States 
actually is and what it should be.  For more than six decades, 
independence and statehood supporters have argued that the 
Commonwealth and its Constitution did not alter Puerto 
Rico’s constitutional status as an unincorporated territory of 
the United States subject to Congress’s plenary powers, 
which, everyone agrees, is nothing more than a colonial 
relationship.  Commonwealth supporters have fervently 
opposed such criticism, instead contending that Puerto Rico 
“decolonized” itself in 1952 through the enactment of the 
Constitution, when it became the sui generis entity that the 
world knows as the Estado Libre Asociado, supposedly created 
with the free consent of the sovereign people of Puerto Rico as 
a compact of association with the United States.  
 
Because of this issue’s obvious significance to the very 
political and legal structure of the island’s government, 
Puerto Ricans have organized themselves electorally mostly 
around each particular group’s preferred position on the 
status question.  The same two parties always alternate 
power: those who favor the annexation of Puerto Rico as a full 
state of the Union vote mostly for the New Progressive Party 
(NPP), while those who favor the Commonwealth vote mostly 
for the Popular Democratic Party (PDP).  And most people 
who favor independence vote—always losing—for the Puerto 
Rican Independence Party (PIP).5  Though other parties have 
sprung up throughout the years attempting to break this 
 
Jeopardy Clause does not bar the government from retrying defendants 
acquitted on some counts but inconsistently convicted on other counts that 
were later vacated based on instructional error. 
5 Brief History of Elections in Puerto Rico, PUERTO RICO 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.enciclopediapr.org/ing/article.cfm?ref=09012602 
[http://perma.cc/5K2G-ZBSN].  For many historically complex reasons, it is 
fair to say that fewer independence supporters vote “as a bloc” for the Puerto 
Rican Independence Party (PIP) than do Commonwealth supporters for the 
PDP or statehood supporters for the NPP. 
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mold, none have succeeded electorally or lasted for a 
significant period of time.6  For better or worse, each party’s 
members’ ideological differences with regard to economic and 
social policies take a backseat to their common perspective on 
the status question.  This divide extends far beyond the 
political electoral arena; it permeates Puerto Rican society in 
general and arouses almost religious-like fervor.  
 
Only if one is aware of this social dynamic can one 
understand the fervor with which the Puerto Rican judges 
involved in both cases expressed their particular views or why 
some of them referred to Puerto Rico as their nation while 
others referred to the United States as theirs. Only then can 
one understand why these are the most important Puerto Rico 
cases that the United States Supreme Court has decided since 
the creation of the Commonwealth, and probably since the 
island became a United States territory in 1898.  The Court 
has finally ended the six-decade old political debate.  The 
Commonwealth lost.  
 
Much will be said about these cases in the upcoming 
years, especially about whether the Court got them right.  
That, however, is not the purpose of this Article.  Though I 
will discuss them thoroughly, this Article’s true intention is to 
illustrate how these two cases dispelled any lingering doubts 
as to the colonial nature of the relationship between Puerto 
Rico and the United States.  
 
Part II of this Article will discuss Puerto Rico v. 
Sánchez Valle, setting forth the underlying facts of the case, 
the legal issues presented, what Puerto Rico courts held, and 
what the Supreme Court ultimately decided.  Part III will 
focus on Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax Free Trust.  
Part IV will illustrate how both cases reveal unequivocally 
that the United States’ legal treatment of Puerto Rico 
amounts to pure colonialism.  Part V will conclude by 
 
6 Id. 
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analyzing whether the Supreme Court of the United States 
can, or should, fix this reality. 
 
II. PUERTO RICO V. SÁNCHEZ VALLE: THE 
COMMONWEALTH’S PLEA FOR [S]OVEREIGNTY 
 
A. Life Before Sánchez Valle 
 
 Almost one hundred years ago, a man named Vito 
Lanza was charged in federal court with possessing, 
manufacturing, and transporting intoxicating liquor7 in 
violation of the National Prohibition Act, commonly known as 
the Volstead Act.8  Because he had already been convicted in 
Washington State Court of possessing, manufacturing, and 
transporting the same liquor, Lanza argued in federal court 
that two punishments for the same act, one under the federal 
law and one under state law, violated the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.9  The district court agreed.  
But the Supreme Court overruled.  Speaking for a unanimous 
Court in United States v. Lanza, Chief Justice Taft concluded 
that “an act denounced as a crime by both national and state 
sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of 
 
7 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 378 (1922). 
8 National Prohibition Act of 1919, Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305 
(repealed 1933). 
9 Lanza, 260 U.S. at 379.  The Fifth Amendment provides that  
 
[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the militia, when in actual service in time of war 
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject 
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.  
 
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).  
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both and may be punished by each.”10  Therefore, the Court 
held, Lanza “committed two different offenses by the same act, 
and a conviction by a court of Washington of the offense 
against that State is not a conviction of the different offense 
against the United States, and so is not double jeopardy.”11  
Thus, the “dual sovereignty” doctrine was born.12 
 
 Though the Court settled the double jeopardy issue 
with regard to federal-state relations, the question as to its 
application in Puerto Rico after the adoption of the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth in 1952 remained 
unaddressed.  That changed in 1987 when two former police 
officers were convicted in the United States District Court for 
the District of Puerto Rico of civil rights violations for 
assaulting and beating three men, after having been 
previously convicted in Commonwealth courts for the same 
acts.  In United States v. López Andino,13 the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit rejected appellants’ claim that Puerto 
Rico and the United States were “the same sovereign” for 
double jeopardy purposes.  The First Circuit 
straightforwardly applied Lanza to Puerto Rico, concluding 
that “[a]lthough the legal relationship between Puerto Rico 
and the United States is far from clear and fraught with 
controversy, it is established that Puerto Rico is to be treated 
as a state for purposes of the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause.”14 
 
 
10 Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382 (emphasis added). 
11 Id. 
12 Even though Lanza predated the world of selective incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights through the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (“The Fifth Amendment, like all other guaranties in the first 
eight amendments, applies only to proceedings by the Federal government,” 
id.), its holding, that the Double Jeopardy Clause applied to the states, 
remained intact after the Supreme Court decided Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784 (1969) (overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)).  See 
also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985). 
13 United States v. López Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1168 (1st Cir. 
1987). 
14 Id. 
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Puerto Rican Circuit Judge Juan R. Torruella 
concurred.  He agreed with the rest of the panel that the 
federal prosecution there was not barred by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.  However, Judge Torruella believed that the 
majority’s discussion regarding Puerto Rico’s sovereignty for 
purposes of double jeopardy was both unnecessary to decide 
the case and erroneous as a matter of law because “Puerto 
Rico is constitutionally a territory, thus lacking that separate 
sovereignty which would allow consecutive Puerto 
Rico/federal prosecutions for what would otherwise be the 
same offenses.”15 
 
 The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico took on this 
question just one year later in Puerto Rico v. Castro García.16  
Unsurprisingly, the Court sided with the First Circuit 
majority in López Andino, concluding that since 1952 the 
island’s political power derived from the consent and will of 
the People of Puerto Rico.  The majority rejected the claim 
that the court was bound by Puerto Rico v. Shell Co.,17 where 
the United States Supreme Court stated that, given the 
territorial condition of Puerto Rico, its statutes stemmed from 
one sovereign power, i.e., the federal power.  Instead, the 
majority concluded that “the pronouncements contained in 
dictum at that time, 1937, are currently devoid of any legal 
basis and should be left to rest in peace.”18  The Supreme 
Court of Puerto Rico also relied on United States v. Wheeler,19 
where the United States Supreme Court held that the Navajo 
Tribe, although under the control of Congress, is a sovereign 
independent of the federal government for purposes of the 
dual sovereignty doctrine because its power to prosecute the 
members of the tribe emanates from its “primeval 
sovereignty.”20 
 
15 Id. at 1172. 
16 Puerto Rico v. Castro García, 20 P.R. Offic. Trans. 775, 823 
(1988). 
17 Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937). 
18 Castro García, 20 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 799. 
19 Id. at 800. 
20 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325 (1978). 
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Justice Negrón García issued a short concurring 
opinion,21 stating that: 
 
It is an historical fact that after the approval of 
the Commonwealth Constitution on July 25, 
1952, Puerto Rico’s juridico-political relations 
with the United States may be characterized as 
peculiar, distinct and unique within the 
constitutional framework of the North 
American federal system.  The issue has 
sparked, and still generates, intense debates in 
the different sectors of public opinion.  There 
are in the legal sphere areas of honest 
differences of opinion not as yet defined by the 
federal Supreme Court in its function as 
ultimate interpreter of the United States 
Constitution.22  
 
The concurring Justice approvingly claimed that the majority 
abstained from drawing the court into “the politico-partisan 
debate that these differences generate,” stating that their 
decision was based on “a strictly legal standpoint” and that 
 
Constitutionally speaking, the pertinent 
historical and political precedents constitute 
solid grounds on which to recognize that the 
People of Puerto Rico enjoy sufficient sovereign 
attributes, although not of a classic mold, to 
conclude and adjudicate—by way of analogy to 
the legal approach prevailing in relation to the 
states of the Union—that successive criminal 
prosecutions in our courts and in the federal 
courts for the same offense do not impinge on 
 
21 In Puerto Rico, lower court judges and Supreme Court judges are 
referred to equally as “juez” or “jueza”—the Spanish word for “judge.” 
However, for purposes of this Article, judges of the Supreme Court of Puerto 
Rico are referred to as “Justices,” the term most commonly used in the 
United States to designate judges from a state’s highest court. 
22 Castro García, 20 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 820. 
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the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause contained in 
Art. II, Section 11 of our Bill of Rights or in the 
Fifth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution.23 
 
The lone dissenter was Justice Francisco Rebollo López.24  
Contrary to the concurrence, the dissent started by accusing 
the majority of playing politics, stating that:  
 
Although in our personal capacity we have the 
absolute constitutional right to believe and 
think in accordance with our particular view of 
life and the world we live in, we, as members of 
this Court, cannot afford the luxury of acting 
and deciding the issues brought to our 
consideration in accordance with those 
personal beliefs or wishes, in total abstraction 
from the legal reality in which we are 
immersed.25  
 
Rebollo López concluded that, although: 
 
Public Law No. 600 of the eighty-first United 
States Congress passed on July 3, 1950, 
authorizing the People of Puerto Rico to 
organize a local government under its own 
Constitution, it is very important that we 
always keep in mind that being said Public Law 
600 ‘an act’ of said Congress, it is not binding 
upon future Congresses and it can be 
unilaterally amended by any future Congress.26  
 
23 Id. at 820–21 (internal citations omitted). 
24 For an analysis on Justice Rebollo López’s judicial philosophy, 
see Andrés González Berdecía & Alejandro Suárez Vincenty, Análisis y 
Perfil Adjudicativo de los Jueces y de las Juezas del Tribunal Supremo de 
Puerto Rico: Francisco Rebollo López, 80 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 107 (2011). 
25 Castro García, 20 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 822 (Rebollo López, J., 
dissenting). 
26 Id. at 828 (internal citations omitted). 
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The dissent quoted several statements made by American and 
Puerto Rican sponsors of the bill at the time of its enactment, 
including then-Governor Luis Muñoz Marín27 and then-
Resident Commissioner Antonio Fernós Isern, who 
respectively stated that Congress could unilaterally change 
the statute in the future, and that the Act would not alter the 
powers of sovereignty acquired by the United States over 
Puerto Rico under the terms of the Treaty of Paris.  The 
dissenting Justice also relied on the fact that Congress has 
continued to treat Puerto Rico differently from states of the 
Union for statutory purposes, a practice the United States 
Supreme Court has upheld,28 pursuant to Congress’s powers 
under the Territorial Clause of the United States 
Constitution.29  The dissent found unpersuasive the majority’s 
reliance on Wheeler since “Puerto Rico has never enjoyed a 
 
27 Luis Muñoz Marín (1898-1980) was the first democratically-
elected Governor of Puerto Rico (1948-1964).  In 1938, he founded the PDP 
as a center-to-left, pro-independence institution, which later abandoned 
both its leftist leanings and its independence stance in favor of the 
Commonwealth option.  He is unquestionably one of the most important 
political figures in Puerto Rican history and will forever be associated with 
the creation of the Commonwealth.  To get an idea of what he represents to 
pro-Commonwealth Puerto Ricans, an American would probably have to 
merge George Washington and Franklin Delano Roosevelt into one person.  
To most pro-independence Puerto Ricans, however, he may fairly be 
characterized as Puerto Rico’s Benedict Arnold, with the title of most 
important political figure of the 20th century falling instead on pro-
independence Nationalist Party leader Dr. Pedro Albizu Campos (1891-
1965).  Although statehood supporters did not have a similar “mythical” 
figure at that time, if they did, it would have to be Luis A. Ferré Aguayo 
(1904-2003), founder of the New Progressive Party (NPP) and the first pro-
statehood Governor of Puerto Rico (1968-1972).  Thus, as shall be seen 
throughout this Article, the reliance on Muñoz Marín’s statements by pro-
statehood judges in order to demonstrate the Commonwealth’s lack of 
sovereignty is by no means a coincidence.  
28 See, e.g., Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980); Torres v. Puerto 
Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978). 
29 “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so 
construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any 
particular State.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
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primeval sovereignty because . . . it was ceded by Spain to the 
United States and it is on that original condition that its 
relationship with the United States is based.”30 
 
 In order to understand why a question settled almost 
three decades ago by both the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 
and the First Circuit reached the United States Supreme 
Court during the October 2015 Term, historical background is 
necessary.31  In November 2004, Anibal Acevedo Vilá won the 
governorship of Puerto Rico for the pro-Commonwealth PDP 
while the pro-statehood NPP obtained control of both houses 
of the legislature.  During this four-year term, the Supreme 
Court of Puerto Rico went from having seven Justices to only 
four.32  Almost a decade before Senate Republicans 
contemplated the idea of not having public hearings on a 
presidential nominee for the United States Supreme Court, 
their Puerto Rican NPP counterparts had already 
“successfully” employed the strategy in the Commonwealth 
with regard to not one, but three Supreme Court vacancies, 
with opposition Senator Jorge de Castro Font expressly 
stating, repeatedly and unapologetically, that no one who did 
not support statehood would be confirmed.33  Unlike President 
 
30 Castro García, 20 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 832 (emphasis added). 
31 For further discussion regarding the changes to the composition 
of the court during this period and their impact on its case law, see Luis J. 
Torres Asencio, Las elecciones y el Tribunal Supremo, 80 GRADOS (November 
9, 2012, 1:10 AM), http://www.80grados.net/las-elecciones-y-el-tribunal-
supremo/ [https://perma.cc/3CVR-LEW2] (in Spanish). 
32 The Commonwealth Constitution states, “The Legislative 
Assembly shall establish a retirement system for judges.  Retirement shall 
be compulsory at the age of seventy.”  P.R. CONST. art. V, § 10.  Justice 
Baltasar Corrada del Río retired in 2005 after turning seventy years old, 
pursuant to the Commonwealth’s constitutional requirement; so did Justice 
Francisco Rebollo López in 2008.  Justice Jaime B. Fuster Berlingeri died 
from cardiac arrest in 2007.  
33 In a phrase now well-known in Puerto Rican popular culture, De 
Castro Font stated that the NPP would have a “banquete total” (literally 
translated as “total banquet,” but more appropriately as “the whole meal”), 
meaning that the NPP would win the next elections and obtain control of 
the Executive, Legislature, and the Supreme Court.  They did.  De Castro 
Font, however, would not reap the benefits.  In October 2008, he was 
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Obama, however, Governor Acevedo Vilá did not nominate a 
candidate.  He lost the November 2008 election by a 
landslide34 and Luis G. Fortuño Burset became Governor.  As 
promised, the pro-statehood NPP quickly filled all three 
vacancies.35  In addition, the only NPP-appointed Justice left 
on the “original” Court retired in 2010,36 giving Fortuño the 
chance to appoint his fourth Justice in less than two years.37  
Thus, for the first time ever, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 
was not “controlled” by Justices appointed by the pro-
Commonwealth PDP.  But simple majority was not enough.  
In compliance with the Commonwealth’s constitutional 
requirement that any increase in the number of seats to the 
Supreme Court be officially requested by the Court itself, the 
“new majority” did just that, and in 2011 Governor Fortuño 
nominated, and the Senate happily confirmed, his fifth and 
sixth Justices.38 
 
 Thus, in just four years, the Supreme Court of Puerto 
Rico shifted from a moderate-to-conservative pro-
Commonwealth institution to a very-conservative pro-
statehood one.39  The effects were felt immediately, with the 
 
arrested and indicted on thirty-two federal charges including fraud, 
extortion, bribery and money laundering, for which he was later convicted 
and sentenced to five years in prison and three years on probation.   
34 In March 2008, Acevedo Vilá was indicted on nineteen counts of 
campaign finance violations.  Five more counts were added later.  One 
month after the general elections, Judge Paul Barbadoro dismissed fifteen 
of the charges and in March 2009 a jury acquitted Acevedo Vilá of all 
remaining charges.  
35 Rafael L. Martínez Torres, Mildred G. Pabón Charneco, and 
Erick V. Kolthoff Caraballo took office in March 2009.  
36 Justice Efraín Rivera Pérez resigned effective July 31, 2010.  He 
died in a motorcycle accident in September 2013.  
37 Edgardo Rivera García took office in August 2010.  
38 Roberto Feliberti Cintrón and Luis F. Estrella Martínez took 
office in May 2011. 
39 In November 2012, Alejandro García Padilla won the 
governorship for the PDP, which also regained control of both branches of 
the Legislature.  Since that time, Chief Justice Federico Hernández Denton 
retired due to age in 2014 and was succeeded as Chief Justice by Associate 
Justice Liana Fiol Matta, who herself retired after turning seventy in early 
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“new Court” upholding the validity of every economic and 
social conservative policy adopted by the NPP administration, 
almost always over the dissent of the three suddenly-more-
liberal pro-Commonwealth Justices.40  It should have come as 
no surprise that issues relating to the nature of the political 
status between Puerto Rico and the United States would be 
looked upon differently by the Court, and that dissenting 
opinions like those espoused by pro-statehood judges 
Torruella and Rebollo López could become the law in Puerto 





2016.  Maite Oronoz Rodríguez was confirmed as Associate Justice in 2014 
and later nominated and summarily confirmed (without public hearings) as 
Chief Justice in 2016.  Ángel Colón Pérez succeeded her as Associate Justice 
in June 2016.  Associate Justice Anabelle Rodríguez Rodríguez is now the 
only Justice on the court appointed prior to 2009.  Because both Hernández 
Denton and Fiol Matta were appointed by PDP administrations, and have 
been succeeded by PDP appointees, the “balance of power” has remained the 
same.  
40 See, e.g., Rivera Schatz v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 
2014 T.S.P.R. 122 (2014) (overruling Col. de Abogados de P.R. v. Schneider, 
112 P.R. Dec. 540 (1982)); E.L.A. v. Nw. Selecta, 185 P.R. Dec. 40 (2012) 
(overruling R.C.A. v. Gobierno de la Capital, 91 P.R. Dec. 416 (1964)); 
Roselló Puig v. Rodríguez Cruz, 183 P.R. Dec. 81 (2011) (partially overruling 
Toppel v. Toppel, 114 P.R. Dec. 775 (1983)); E.L.A. v. Crespo Torres, 180 
P.R. Dec. 776 (2011) (overruling among others, Sepúlveda v. Depto. de 
Salud, 145 P.R. Dec. 560 (1998); Aulet v. Depto. Servicios Sociales, 129 P.R. 
Dec. 1 (1991); A.C.A.A. v. Bird Piñero, 115 P.R. Dec. 463 (1984); Cartagena 
v. E.L.A., 116 P.R. Dec. 254 (1985); American R.R. Co. of P.R. v. Wolkers, 22 
P.R. Dec. 283 (1915); Arandes v. Báez, 20 P.R. Dec. 388 (1914)). 
41 After the case ended in the United States Supreme Court, 
Sánchez Valle’s attorneys from the Legal Aid Society (“Sociedad para la 
Asistencia Legal”) stated publicly that they initially saw the case as one of 
civil rights only, and were “unaware” of its political ramifications until the 
Puerto Rico Solicitor General Office appeared before the Court of Appeals.  
That statement, however, should hardly be taken seriously.  See José A. 
Delgado and Cynthia López Cabán, Habita en suelo federal la soberanía de 
Puerto Rico, EL NUEVO DÍA (June 10, 2016, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/politica/nota/habitaensuelofederallaso
beraniadepuertorico-2208796/ [https://perma.cc/S4ZR-ZJAP] (in Spanish). 
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B. The Case in Puerto Rico 
 
1. The Court of First Instance 
 
 In September 2008, several complaints were filed 
against Sánchez Valle in Commonwealth courts for violations 
of the Puerto Rico Weapons Act, alleging that he illegally sold 
and transferred a weapon and ammunition.42  In June 2010, 
Sánchez Valle asked the Court of First Instance to dismiss the 
charges against him because he had already been sentenced 
to prison, house arrest, and supervised release in federal court 
for the same acts for which he was being prosecuted in Puerto 
Rico.  Like López Andino and Castro García before him, 
Sánchez Valle argued that his second prosecution constituted 
double jeopardy because the Commonwealth and the federal 
government were the same sovereign for double jeopardy 
purposes.43 
 
 While acknowledging in a single paragraph that 
Castro García held exactly the opposite,44 the Court of First 
Instance nonetheless held that: 
 
[D]ue to historical reasons and reasons of 
political, social, judicial and constitutional 
reality, the doctrine of ‘dual judicial 
sovereignty’ does not apply to the controversy 
at hand.  We believe that sovereignty or the 
source of power of Puerto Rico to prosecute its 
 
42 Judicial proceedings in Puerto Rico are conducted in Spanish.  
All quotations to judgments of the Court of First Instance and the Court of 
Appeals, as well as opinions of the Supreme Court, refer to the certified 
translations of such decisions included in the parties’ joint appendix to the 
United States Supreme Court in Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle.  Joint 
Appendix, Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (No. 15-108) 
[hereinafter SVJA]. 
43 Id. at 308a–09a. 
44 Id. at 319a–20a. 
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citizens resides and emanates from the federal 
government through Congress.45  
 
In closing, the court added that:  
 
[I]t cannot be concluded in any way that with 
the mere approval of an Insular Constitution 
(at the mercy of legislative action by Congress), 
Puerto Rico (which never had any degree of 
sovereignty throughout its historical 
trajectory), acquired a sovereignty similar to 
that of the States of the Union, which is the 
basis of their judicial sovereignty vis-à-vis the 
judicial sovereignty of the central federal 
government.  This is the current political, legal 
and constitutional reality between Puerto Rico 
and the United States of America.  Regardless 
of what legal fiction may be formulated to state 
otherwise, no matter how many times it is 
enunciated or how well it may be disguised in 
jurisprudence, it will never cease to exist in its 
chimerical setting and become a reality.46 
 
These strong words came from a judge who was openly 
contradicting clear binding precedent from the highest court 
of his jurisdiction.  The court felt no need to distinguish the 
case from Castro García or explain why that case was no 
longer good law.  Instead, it mostly cited approvingly the 
understanding of sovereignty espoused in a law review 
article47 and misleadingly suggested that one of the leading 
Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure scholars in Puerto 
Rico, professor Ernesto L. Chiesa Aponte, supported the 
court’s venture into a question settled long ago in Puerto 
 
45 Id. at 321a. 
46 Id. at 324a–325a (emphasis added). 
47 Id. at 333a.  See also Fermín Arraiza Navas, Soberanía v. 
Soberanía Dual, 25 REV. JUR. U.I.P.R. 645 (1991). 
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Rico.48  The reason why the court was not worried about stare 
decisis should be apparent by now: there was a new Supreme 
 
48 Professor Chiesa merely stated the following: 
 
[T]he particular status of the Commonwealth 
raises passionate controversies regarding the 
applicability of the doctrine of dual sovereignty 
for purposes of the protection against double 
jeopardy, in the federal-insular context. Of 
course, when faced with a prosecution by another 
State, followed or preceded by a federal 
prosecution, the doctrine of dual sovereignty is 
applied. But when faced with a criminal 
prosecution under the laws of the 
Commonwealth, followed or preceded by a federal 
prosecution, the applicability of the doctrine of 
dual sovereignty will depend on the answer to the 
following question: [do] the criminal laws of the 
Commonwealth emanate from an independent 
sovereignty or, ultimately, from the federal 
government?  This question has not been 
addressed—and will probably not be addressed—
by the [United States] Supreme Court.  
 
 . . . .  
 
Castro is not the last word regarding the 
applicability of the doctrine of dual judicial 
sovereignty to Puerto Rico; under the Fifth 
Amendment, the federal courts can rule 
otherwise, that is, as stated in the dissenting 
opinion.  Additionally, it is also not clear whether 
Castro has the scope to interpret the 
Commonwealth’s constitutional clause against 
double jeopardy and the barring of multiple 
prosecutions in Article 63 of the Penal Code, to 
deny protection in cases involving inter-
jurisdictional (federal-state) prosecutions. On one 
hand, it can be said that what the Supreme Court 
had before it was a constitutional matter 
involving double jeopardy, basis of the appealed 
decision, and not a statutory matter under Article 
63 of the Penal Code. On the other hand, it can be 
said that what is being appealed is the sentence 
and not its grounds, for which reason Article 63 
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Court in San Juan.  Before getting there, however, Puerto 
Rico’s intermediate appellate court would weigh in on the 
matter.  
 
2. The Court of Appeals 
 
 The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, although 
every member of the three-judge panel seemed to rely on 
somewhat different grounds.  Through Judge Carlos Cabrera, 
the court held that Puerto Rico was a sovereign for double 
jeopardy purposes.49  The appellate court extensively 
discussed Lanza and its progeny, as well as López Andino, but 
did not reopen the question or respond to any of the lower 
court’s assertions, instead reciting what the Supreme Court of 
Puerto Rico held in Castro García, and applying it as binding 
precedent.  Unlike the lower court’s judgment, which referred 
to Puerto Rico as “the Island” and consciously talked about the 
“local” and “Insular” Constitution, the appellate court referred 
to Puerto Rico as “[o]ur country.”50 
 
 Judge Teresa Medina Monteserín issued a short 
concurring opinion in which she acknowledged that Castro 
García controlled, but expressly asked the Puerto Rico 
Supreme Court to overrule the opinion and adopt Judge 
Rebollo López’s dissenting position because, in her view, 
Puerto Rico remained “an unincorporated territory of the 
United States of America.”51  
 
was implicitly rejected as basis to confirm the 
appealed decision. 
 
ERNESTO L. CHIESA APONTE, DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL DE PUERTO RICO Y 
ESTADOS UNIDOS 429–30 (Tercer Mundo Limitada ed. 1991). 
49 SVJA, supra note 42, at 280a–81a (emphasis added) (internal 
citations omitted). 
50 In explaining the defendants’ arguments, the court stated that 
they claimed that “[o]ur country continues to be an unincorporated territory 
of the United States of America.”  Id. at 279a.  The practical political, and 
thus legal, relevance of referring to Puerto Rico as a nation or country will 
be addressed in Part IV infra.  
51 Id. at 284a. 
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 Judge Troadio González Vargas filed an important 
“particular vote” that sets forth the pro-Commonwealth view.  
The judge humbly recognized at the outset that “the present 
legal controversy, though legitimate, is inevitably impacted or 
influenced by the omnipresent debate about the subject of the 
political status of Puerto Rico,”52 adding that “the legal 
analysis of this controversy is inevitably intertwined with, 
and influenced by, the ideological debate surrounding the 
subject of the status, for which reason we cannot realistically 
separate both matters.”53  After his disclaimer, the judge 
argued in detail that, through the enactment of the Federal 
Relations Act in 1950 and the subsequent adoption of the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth in 1952, Puerto Rico 
ceased to be an unincorporated territory of the United States 
subject to Congress’ plenary powers under the Territorial 
Clause, as previously decided by the United States Supreme 
Court; instead, with the consent of the People of Puerto Rico, 
Puerto Rico became a Commonwealth, meaning a distinct 
political entity, “sovereign” over matters not delegated to the 
United States through “a compact” of association.  In plain 
terms, the judge claimed that Puerto Ricans exercised their 
right to self-determination as a nation under international 
law, and thus the source of the Commonwealth’s criminal laws 
emanates from the People of Puerto Rico.   
 
Therefore, the judge concluded that:  
 
It is legally unacceptable and contrary to the 
dignity of every Puerto Rican to argue that 
even the adoption of their criminal laws and the 
indictment for the violation of same are merely 
the result of gifts or graces by the people of the 
United States, as if we found ourselves in the 
times of the crudest colonial regime.  We find it 
to be equally offensive to the dignity of the 
people of the United States to be accused of 
 
52 Id. at 286a. 
53 Id. at 287a–88a.  
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such colonial brutality in the dawn of the [21st] 
century, and of being and acting as an 
international felon in front of the community of 
nations, in which they care to be regarded as a 
leader of international morality.54   
 
The judge referred to Puerto Rico as “our country” and “a 
nation” on numerous occasions.55 
 
3. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 
 
 As expected, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 
expressly overruled García Castro.  Through Justice Martínez 
Torres, the pro-statehood majority concluded that “the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is not a sovereign entity 
inasmuch as, being a territory, its ultimate source of power to 
prosecute offenses is derived from the United States 
Congress.”56  Thus, the court held that “a person who was 
prosecuted in federal court cannot be prosecuted for the same 
offense in the Puerto Rico courts because that would 
constitute a violation of the constitutional protection against 
double jeopardy, as provided in the Fifth Amendment [of the 
United States Constitution].”57 
 
 The court explained that under Grafton v. United 
States,58 a case decided almost one hundred years earlier, a 
territory of the United States is not sovereign for double 
jeopardy purposes.  Instead, “a territory owes its existence 
wholly to the federal government, and its tribunals exert all 
their powers by authority of the United States.”59 
 
 
54 SVJA, supra note 42, at 304a–05a. 
55 Id. at 286a–305a. 
56 Id. at 66a (emphasis omitted). 
57 Id. at 67a. 
58 Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907). 
59 SVJA, supra note 42, at 23a (quoting Grafton, 206 U.S. at 354).  
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The majority also found support in Wheeler, where the 
United States Supreme Court reiterated that “City and State, 
or Territory and Nation, are not two separate sovereigns.”60  
Unlike their predecessors in Castro García, who believed that 
the statements contained in Puerto Rico v. Shell Co.61 were 
dicta “devoid of any legal basis and should be left to rest in 
peace,”62 the new majority found them “[o]f particular 
importance” to the case before them.  Although the new Puerto 
Rico Supreme Court did not refute the claim that this 
statement was dictum, the court nonetheless relied heavily on 
it, perhaps finding it too crucial to be ignored.  
 
The majority also pointed out that other federal courts 
of appeals had refused to apply the dual sovereignty doctrine 
to United States territories.63  In what it considered “an 
exercise of intellectual honesty,”64 the court explained that in 
United States v. Sánchez65 the Eleventh Circuit correctly 
applied Shell Co. as binding precedent when it held that 
Puerto Rico remained a territory of the United States for 
double jeopardy purposes, and thus not a separate sovereign, 
notwithstanding the fact that it directly conflicted with the 
First Circuit’s holding in López Andino. 
 
 The court then got to the crux of its argument: the 
Insular Cases66 declared Puerto Rico to be an unincorporated 
 
60 Id. at 24a (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 321) (emphasis added). 
61 Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937). 
62 Castro García, 20 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 799. 
63 Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 633 F.2d 660, 669 (3rd Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 960 (1980) (asserting that the Territory of the 
United States Virgin Islands and the United States government constitute 
a single sovereignty for purposes of the clause against double jeopardy). 
64 SVJA, supra note 42, at 30a. 
65 United States v. Sánchez, 992 F.2d 1143 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 1110 (1994). 
66 For a comprehensive sociological and legal analysis of the Insular 
Cases and the history of the relationship between Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
by a pro-independence commentator, see EFRÉN RIVERA RAMOS, AMERICAN 
COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO: THE JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL LEGACY (Markus 
Wiener Publishers ed., 2009). For further discussion of the Insular Cases 
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territory, and neither the enactment of the Puerto Rico 
Federal Relations Act in 1950 nor the Constitution adopted 
pursuant to it in 1952 altered that constitutional reality. 67 
 
Decided by the United States Supreme Court in the 
early part of the 20th century, the Insular Cases deal with the 
“acquisition” of new lands by the United States following the 
Spanish-American War.68  Although each case addressed a 
particular issue, commentators characterized the underlying 
question that needed to be settled by the Court as “whether 
the Constitution followed the flag.”  The answer was an 
 
and Puerto Rican constitutional law, see generally JOSÉ J. ÁLVAREZ 
GONZÁLEZ, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL DE PUERTO RICO Y RELACIONES 
CONSTITUCIONALES CON LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS (2009).   
For pro-Commonwealth commentators, see Salvador E. Casellas, 
Commonwealth Status and the Federal Courts, 80 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 946, 954 
(2011); JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL DE PUERTO RICO 
(1980); but see JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST 
COLONY IN THE WORLD (1997).  For pro-statehood commentators, see JUAN R. 
TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF 
SEPARATE & UNEQUAL (1985); see also Gustavo A. Gelpí, Los casos insulares: 
Un studio histórico comparativo de Puerto Rico, Hawái y las Islas Filipinas, 
45 REV. JUR. U.I.P.R. 215 (2011); Carlos Saavedra Gutiérrez, Incorporación 
de jure o incorporación de facto: Dos propuestas para erradicar fantasmas 
constitucionales, 80 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 967 (2011); Christina Duffy Burnett & 
A.I. Cepeda Derieux, Los casos insulares: Doctrina desanexionista, 78 REV. 
JUR. U.P.R. 661 (2009).   
For a collection of essays on the Insular Cases from commentators 
of different ideological persuasions, see Gerald L. Neuman & Tomik Brown-
Nagin, RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE 
AMERICAN EMPIRE (2015). 
67 SVJA, supra note 42, at 33a–62a. 
68 See The Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Huus v. N.Y. & 
Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 
(1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v. United 
States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); 
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).  See also Ocampo v. United States, 
234 U.S. 91 (1914); Ochoa v. Hernández, 230 U.S. 139 (1913); Dowdell v. 
United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468 (1909); 
Kent v. People of Porto Rico, 207 U.S. 113 (1907); Trono v. United States, 
199 U.S. 521 (1905); Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Dorr 
v. United States, 195 U.S. 158 (1904); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 
(1904); González v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 
U.S. 197 (1903). 
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unequivocal “not necessarily.”  In Downes v. Bidwell,69 the 
United States Supreme Court held that Puerto Rico had 
become a “territory” of the United States after the signing of 
the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain in 
1898, coining a phrase forever ingrained in Puerto Rican legal 
culture: Puerto Rico belonged to, but was not a part of, the 
United States.70  As such, Congress had “plenary power” over 
Puerto Rico, subject only to some basic principles “which are 
the basis of all free government.”71  Justice White’s concurring 
opinion in Downes established what would later become the 
basic holding of the Insular Cases.72  Under his view, there 
were two types of territories: Those that Congress intended to 
“incorporate” as part of the Union, in which the Constitution 
applied ex proprio vigore, and those that remained 
“unincorporated,” in which the Constitution did not apply 
except for those provisions deemed basic or fundamental.  
Puerto Rico fell into the latter group.  This situation did not 
change after Congress enacted a new organic charter known 
as the Jones Act in 1917,73 by virtue of which Puerto Ricans 
became United States citizens.74 
 
 
69 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
70 Id. at 287 (“We are therefore of opinion that the island of Porto 
Rico [sic] is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but 
not a part of the United States. . .”) (emphasis added). 
71 Id. at 290–91. 
72 Id. (White, J., concurring).  See also Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 
298 (1922). 
73 Jones Act, ch. 190, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 
731 (1987).  For more on the effects of American citizenship in Puerto Rico, 
see EFRÉN RIVERA RAMOS, AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO, supra 
note 66, at 145–89.  See also José Cabranes, Citizenship and the American 
Empire, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391 (1978); JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, 1 HISTORIA 
CONSTITUCIONAL DE PUERTO RICO 70–110 (1981) (in Spanish); RAÚL SERRANO 
GEYLS, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL DE ESTADOS UNIDOS Y PUERTO RICO-
DOCUMENTOS-JURISPRUDENCIA-ANOTACIONES-PREGUNTAS 467–70 (1986) (in 
Spanish). 
74 Balzac, 258 U.S. at 306 (“Had Congress intended to take the 
important step of changing the treaty status of Porto Rico by incorporating 
it into the Union, it is reasonable to suppose that it would have done so by 
the plain declaration, and would not have left it to mere inference.”). 
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 After relying on Boumediene v. Bush75 for the 
proposition that “[d]espite the criticism of its disdainful and 
contemptuous tone towards the inhabitants of the territories, 
and of the obsolescence of much of the holdings of the Insular 
Cases, the core part of the doctrine has continued to be 
used,”76 the Puerto Rico Supreme Court in Sánchez Valle 
turned to congressional history to show why the adoption of 
the Commonwealth Constitution did not change the 
territorial status of Puerto Rico.77  The court extensively 
quoted then-Governor Luis Muñoz Marín’s statements that 
Congress could unilaterally amend the Puerto Rican Federal 
Relations Act “if the People of Puerto Rico should go crazy,”78 
as well as then-Resident Commissioner Antonio Fernós 
Isern’s assertions that the Act “would not alter the powers of 
sovereignty acquired by the United States over Puerto Rico 
under the terms of the Treaty of Paris.”79  The majority also 
pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has 
continued to treat Puerto Rico as a territory after the creation 
of the Commonwealth,80 in addition to the Executive Branch 
of the United States government.81  Thus, the court concluded 
that there was unanimity among the three federal branches 
regarding this matter.  At no point in its sixty-nine page 




75 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008) (“[T]he Court 
devised in the Insular Cases a doctrine that allowed it to use its power 
sparingly and where it would be most needed.  This century-old doctrine 
informs our analysis in the present matter”). 
76 SVJA, supra note 42, at 40a. 
77 Id. at 41a–46a. 
78 Id. at 41a.  
79 Id. at 42a. 
80 Id. at 46a–59a. 
81 Id. at 59a–62a (citing The Presidential Task Force on the Status 
of Puerto Rico, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/Puerto_Rico_Report_
Espanol.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ2J-7CZE] (in Spanish). 
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 Then-Chief Justice Fiol Matta issued a lengthy 
concurring opinion,82 which was joined by then-Associate 
Justice Oronoz Rodríguez.  Perhaps the most consistently-
liberal Justice to ever sit on the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 
Fiol Matta83 concluded that double jeopardy applied “not 
because Puerto Rico lacks sovereignty to prosecute the 
petitioners,84 but because under the circumstances of this 
case, doing so would violate the protection against double 
jeopardy that our [Puerto Rican] Constitution85 guarantees 
them.”86  The Chief Justice adopted a view that no party or 
prior judge had advanced—and that the majority consciously 
avoided—by interpreting the Commonwealth’s Double 
Jeopardy Clause more broadly than its federal counterpart in 
order to reject the application of the dual sovereignty 
doctrine.87  This was a position that, if accepted by the 
majority, would have made the court’s ruling unreviewable by 
the United States Supreme Court.88  According to then-Chief 
 
82 The certified translation of Chief Justice Fiol Matta’s concurring 
opinion contains one hundred and twenty pages. See SVJA, supra note 42, 
at 71a–190a.  Although Fiol Matta was well-known for issuing long 
opinions, her concurrence in Sánchez Valle was the longest one in her twelve 
years on the Court. 
83 For an analysis	on Justice Fiol Matta’s judicial philosophy, see 
Ricardo Ortiz Morales & Michelle R. Robles Torres, Figuras jurídicas en 
contexto:  añálisis del discurso de la jueza Fiol Matta en la adjudicaciòn de 
controversias ante el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico, 80 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 
11 (2011) (in Spanish).	
84 In Parts IV & IV of the opinion, the Chief Justice discusses in 
detail why she believes that it is well settled in both federal and 
Commonwealth courts that in 1952 Puerto Rico ceased to be a territory of 
the United States subject to the plenary powers of Congress.  Id. at 116a–
164a.  Because her position regarding this matter does not relevantly differ 
from that espoused by Justice Rodríguez Rodríguez in her dissenting 
opinion, I will focus on the latter. 
85 P.R. CONST. art. II, § 11. 
86 SVJA, supra note 42, at 73a. 
87 The Chief Justice clarified that her view was not based only on 
the “so-called ‘broader scope’ of the Commonwealth Constitution,” but on 
“an imperative resulting from the inviolability of the dignity of the human 
being” consecrated in the Puerto Rican Bill of Rights.  Id. at 186a–87a. 
88 As stated in the opinion, several states have enacted statutes 
similar to Rule 1.10 of the Model Penal Code, which limits the authority of 
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Justice Fiol Matta, “[i]n its haste to undermine the spirit of 
our [Puerto Rican] Constitution and our efforts to affirm 
ourselves as a nation, the majority has ignored the actual 
controversy involved in this case: The fundamental 
inconsistency between the possibility of prosecuting an 
individual twice for the same criminal acts and the crucial 
guiding principle of Puerto Rico’s Constitution, the 
inviolability of human dignity.”89 
 
The lone dissenter this time was Justice Anabelle 
Rodríguez Rodríguez.90  Like she has done repeatedly since 
2008, Justice Rodríguez Rodríguez issued a scathing dissent, 
stating at the outset that “[o]nce again, a majority of this 
[c]ourt hastens to overrule, on questionable grounds, firmly-
established precedents of our legal system.”91  Also, just like 
the majority relied mostly on pro-statehood legal scholars, 
Justice Rodríguez Rodríguez relied heavily on pro-
Commonwealth ones.92  She claimed that the court’s decision 
 
a jurisdiction to prosecute a person for conduct for which he or she has 
already been prosecuted in another jurisdiction.  See Comm. v. Mills, 286 
A.2d 638, 643–644 (1971).  Other states afford the same protection expressly 
in their Constitution, see MONT. CONST. art. II, § 25, or their highest court 
has recognized it as a state constitutional mandate.  See State v. Hogg, 118 
N.H. 262, 267 (1978). 
89 SVJA, supra note 42, at 73a (emphasis added).  
90 The author clerked for Justice Rodríguez Rodríguez during the 
October 2011 Term. 
91 SVJA, supra note 42, at 192a. 
92 In footnote 3, Justice Rodríguez Rodríguez states that “[t]here is 
no doubt that Mr. José Trías Monge, who presided this Court from April 19, 
1974, to September 30, 1985, has been our most distinguished jurist.”  
SVJA, supra note 42, at 193a.  In footnote 24, the Justice refers to him as 
“the most eminent Puerto Rican jurist.”  Id. at 217a.  Trías Monge’s 
contributions as a judge and as a scholar are widely recognized and 
appreciated by the Puerto Rican legal community, and deservedly so.  His 
contributions, like those of other commentators mentioned here, should not 
be diminished because of his known position on the status question; 
however, they should be contextualized.  Though the conclusion that Trías 
Monge is “our most distinguished” or “most eminent jurist” is more-easily 
drawn by pro-Commonwealth scholars, it is fair to say that many other legal 
minds would also consider him the Puerto Rican John Marshall.  And even 
Trías Monge himself referred to the Commonwealth as “the oldest colony in 
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was based “more on ideology than on law”93 and expressly 
asked the United States Supreme Court to reverse it.94   
 
The dissent accused the majority of engaging in 
“disconcerting historical revisionism,”95stating as follows:  
 
[T]here can be no doubt that the Court 
majority’s objective is to advance its ideology on 
the status of Puerto Rico and has used, and will 
continue to use, legal opinions to do so. This, 
despite the fact that ideological campaigns are 
incumbent on the political process, not court 
decisions. With such an objective, the majority 
disregards the provisions of our Constitution, 
our laws, what the social wellbeing of our 
Country demands and even the provisions of 
the U.S. Constitution and the precedents of the 
U.S. Supreme Court. In short, nothing 
persuades, nothing matters to this majority, 
when arguments are inconvenient to certain 
ideological posture. It appears that the only 
thing that matters to them is achieving through 
[c]ourts what has not been achieved and should 
be done through the political process. That is, 
they are using the court’s function as another 
mechanism to exercise political pressure to 
pursue their political ideologies, which 
conveniently translates into simplistic and out-
of-context legal interpretations. In the process, 
all of our prior opinions regarding Puerto Rico 
constitutional framework are dismantled. To 
use this higher court for such purposes is 
profoundly anti-democratic and, therefore, 
 
the world” after leaving the Court.  See TRÍAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE 
TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD, supra, note 66. 
93 SVJA, supra note 42, at 194a. 
94 Id. at 196a. 
95 Id. at 241a. 
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notably and ironically anti-American. It 
contravenes fundamental notions of how 
politics should be done and, in the process, 
tarnishes the legitimacy of this Court. As I have 
stated before: What a shame!96 
 
Justice Rodríguez Rodríguez followed the traditional pro-
Commonwealth vision relied upon by the Supreme Court of 
Puerto Rico in Castro García and the First Circuit in López 
Andino.  In essence, she rejected that Shell Co. controlled, 
claiming that the statements contained therein were dicta97 
that could not apply to Puerto Rico after 1952 because it had 
ceased to be a territory belonging to the United States and 
instead had become a sui generis, “atypical” “sovereign 
entity,”98  “at least, with regard to its internal affairs.”99  The 
dissent criticized the majority for adopting an “anachronistic” 
view of sovereignty100 and questioned the validity of the “so-
called Insular Cases,”101 arguing that, with the consent of the 
Puerto Rican people, Congress “relinquished its plenary 
powers regarding Puerto Rico in what pertains to its internal 
affairs.”102  In what constitutes classic pro-Commonwealth 
legal parlance, Justice Rodríguez Rodríguez concluded that 
“the Constitution of the Commonwealth is not just another 
Organic Act of the Congress.  We find no reason to impute to 
the Congress the perpetration of such a monumental hoax.  
Public Law 600 offered to the people of Puerto Rico a ‘compact’ 
under which, if the people accepted it, as they did, they were 
authorized to ‘organize a government pursuant to a 
constitution of their own adoption.’”103 
 
96 Id. at 241a–42a (emphasis added). 
97 Id. at 209a. 
98 On “atypicality,” see id. at 215a, n.23.  
99 SVJA, supra note 42, at 239a. 
100 On “sovereignty”, see infra Part IV; SVJA, supra note 42, at 
219a–225a. 
101 Id. at 208a, n.16. 
102 Id. at 230a.  
103 Id. at 226a–27a, n.33 (quoting Figueroa v. People of Puerto Rico, 
232 F.2d 615, 620 (1st Cir. 1956).  
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Unlike the majority, Justice Rodríguez Rodríguez 
referred to Puerto Rico as “our Country” on several occasions 
throughout her opinion; unlike Fiol Matta, she did not use the 
term “nation.”104 
 
C. The Case Before the United States Supreme 
Court 
 
 The Commonwealth filed its petition for Writ of 
Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on July 15, 
2015, which the Court granted on October 1, 2015.  At that 
point, it was unclear what position the Obama Administration 
would assume in the case, if any.  Though the federal 
government had occasionally stated in different contexts 
throughout the years that Puerto Rico remained a territory, 
as explained in the lower courts’ decisions, not once since the 
creation of the Commonwealth had the Department of Justice 
unambiguously assumed that position before the Supreme 
Court, much less validated the Insular Cases.  In fact, in López 
Andino the federal government took the opposite view when 
it asked the First Circuit to hold that Puerto Rico was a 
separate sovereign for double jeopardy purposes.105 
 
That being the case, the people who believed that the 
federal government would adopt a similar position in Sánchez 
Valle should hardly be faulted for their view.  On December 
23, 2015, the United States filed an amicus brief in support of 
Respondents.  Acknowledging that it was changing its prior 
position, the United States asserted that “[t]hose briefs do not 
 
104 In Part II, the dissent briefly dismissed Chief Justice Fiol 
Matta’s argument that, although the Puerto Rico possessed sovereignty for 
double jeopardy purposes, the Commonwealth Constitution’s Double 
Jeopardy Clause nonetheless barred the second prosecutions in the case. 
Justice Rodríguez Rodríguez concluded that “‘[t]here is no basis to hold that 
the clause was given or should be given greater content’ in the Puerto Rican 
constitutional order.’”  Id. at 202a (quoting Ernesto L. Chiesa Aponte, Doble 
Exposición, 59 REV. JUR. U. P.R. 479, 480 (1990)).   
105 See United States v. López Andino, 831 F.2d at 1167–68 (1st Cir. 
1987).  
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reflect the considered view of the Executive Branch.”106  
Instead, the United States now argued that “[a]lthough 
Puerto Rico exercises significant local authority, with great 
benefit to its people and to the United States, Puerto Rico 
remains a territory under our constitutional system.  Puerto 
Rico does not possess sovereignty independent of the United 
States, and its prosecutions cannot invoke the dual 
sovereignty doctrine under the Double Jeopardy Clause.”107  
By a six to two vote, the Court agreed.108 
 
 In an opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court held that 
Puerto Rico and the federal government are the same 
sovereign for double jeopardy purposes “because the oldest 
roots of Puerto Rico’s power to prosecute lie in federal soil.”109  
The majority began by analyzing Congress’s historical 
treatment of Puerto Rico.  As most courts usually do, the 
Court focused on the various “organic acts” that Congress has 
enacted to rule over the island.110  The story goes as follows: 
Puerto Rico became a United States territory following the 
Spanish-American War through the Treaty of Paris of 1898, 
when Spain “ceded” the island to the United States, “and 
tasked Congress with determining ‘[t]he civil rights and 
political status’ of its inhabitants.’”111  Congress then 
“established” a “civil government” in 1900 through what is 
commonly referred to as the Foraker Act.112  Puerto Ricans 
became United States citizens in 1917 when Congress passed 
the Jones Act, which also “granted” additional autonomy.113   
 
 
106 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 32, n.6, Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016) 
(No. 15-108) [hereinafter USAB].  
107 Id. at 34.   
108 Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016).  
109 Id. at 1868.   
110 Id. at 1884.  
111 Id. at 1868. 
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
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In 1947, Congress “empowered the Puerto Rican people 
to elect their own governor, a right never before accorded in a 
[United States] territory.”114  Then, through Public Law 600, 
in 1950 Congress “enabled Puerto Rico to embark on the 
project of constitutional self-governance,” which ultimately 
led to the adoption of a Constitution drafted by the Puerto 
Rican people, and was later approved by both Congress and 
Puerto Rico.115  That Constitution “created a new political 
entity, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico—or, in Spanish, 
Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico,” which proclaims that 
the Commonwealth’s power “emanates from the people and 
shall be exercised in accordance with their will, within the 
terms of the compact agreed upon between the people of 
Puerto Rico and the United States.”116  It took the Court three 
pages to explain more than 115 years of Puerto Rico-United 
States relations, after which it claimed to “leave the lofty 
sphere of constitutionalism for the grittier precincts of 
criminal law.”117 
 
 The majority explained that “[t]o determine whether 
two prosecuting authorities are different sovereigns for double 
jeopardy purposes,”118 the Court asks a “narrow, historically 
focused question”: “whether the prosecutorial powers of the 
two jurisdictions have independent origins—or, said 
conversely, whether those powers derive from the same 
 
114 Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1868. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1868–69 (emphasis added).  
117 Id. at 1869. 
118 In the first footnote of the opinion, the Court stated that it had 
“no occasion to consider” whether the Double Jeopardy Clause “applies to 
Puerto Rico” “[b]ecause the parties in this case agree” that it does.  Id. at 
1885, n.1. As fascinating as that may sound, the Court seemed to forget that 
in 1976 it ruled that “that the protections accorded by either the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to residents of 
Puerto Rico,” hence inventing yet another “peculiar” doctrine applied to 
Puerto Rico, the “either-or doctrine.” Examining Bd. of Eng’rs v. Flores de 
Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600 (1976).  
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‘ultimate source.’”119  The Court then held that while both 
states and Indian tribes possess an independent source of 
sovereignty from the United States, the Commonwealth does 
not.  In a sentence that will probably be added to the those 
Insular Cases phrases forever ingrained in Puerto Rican legal 
culture, the Court bluntly enunciated that “[t]he island’s 
Constitution, significant though it is, does not break the 
chain,”120 thus finally officially debunking one of the most 
commonly-held myths in Puerto Rico.  Justice Kagan then 
concluded her opinion as follows: 
 
Puerto Rico boasts ‘a relationship to the United 
States that has no parallel in our history.’  And 
since the events of the early 1950’s, an integral 
aspect of that association has been the 
Commonwealth’s wide-ranging self-rule, 
exercised under its own Constitution.  As a 
result of that charter, Puerto Rico today can 
avail itself of a wide variety of futures.  But for 
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the 
future is not what matters—and there is no 
getting away from the past.  Because the 
ultimate source of Puerto Rico’s prosecutorial 
power is the Federal Government—because 
when we trace that authority all the way back, 
we arrive at the doorstep of the U. S. Capitol—
the Commonwealth and the United States are 
not separate sovereigns.  That means the two 
governments cannot ‘twice put’ respondents 
Sánchez Valle and Gómez Vázquez ‘in jeopardy’ 
for the ‘same offence.’  We accordingly affirm 




119 Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1867. 
120 Id. at 1876 (emphasis added). 
121 Id. 1876–77 (internal citations omitted).  
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The majority went as far as to call “deeply disturbing” the 
dissent’s argument that “it is difficult to . . . conclude that the 
tribes do possess this authority but Puerto Rico does not,” 
rebutting that it has been settled for nearly two centuries that 
the tribes have “inherent authority.”122  Yet denying the same 
treatment to Puerto Rico, a community constituted politically 
decades before any of the original states had even been 
founded, did not disturb the Court.123 
 
The Court never referred to Puerto Rico as a nation.  
The word colony was nowhere to be found in the opinion, 
except when the Court once referred to Puerto Rico as a 
Spanish colony that was “ceded” by Spain to the United States 
in 1898, fifty-four years before it supposedly evolved “into a 
constitutional democracy exercising local self-rule.”124  
Conspicuously omitted, too, was the term “unincorporated 
territory” or any mention whatsoever of the Insular Cases, the 
very doctrine which the Court necessarily relied upon in order 
to so easily validate Congress’s constitutional authority over 
Puerto Rico. 
 
 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg issued a concurring 
opinion, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas.  Though she 
agreed with the majority in full, it appears that she would 
overrule the dual sovereignty doctrine recognized in Lanza “in 
a future case in which a defendant faces successive 
prosecutions by parts of the whole USA.”125  Justice Thomas 
filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment.  He disagreed with the Court’s “portions of the 
opinion concerning the application of the Double Jeopardy 
 
122 Id. at 1873, n.5. 
123 Perhaps Taíno descendants in Puerto Rico now have a better 
shot at sovereignty under American constitutional law than do Puerto 
Ricans themselves.  According to traditional historical accounts, the Taínos 
were the native group that predominated in Puerto Rico (Borikén, as they 
called it) before and during the first centuries of Spanish conquest over the 
island. 
124 Sánchez Valle, 136 St. Ct. at 1868. 
125 Id. at 1877 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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Clause to successive prosecutions involving Indian tribes.”126  
Thus, it appears that he would at least overrule Wheeler and 
its recognition of Indian tribe sovereignty for double jeopardy 
purposes.  
 
Justice Stephen Breyer sided with the Commonwealth 
in a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice 
Sotomayor.  He disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that 
a historical inquiry would “reveal” Congress as the ultimate 
source of power in Puerto Rico, responding that the Court does 
not mean literally what it says because it does not trace the 
island’s “source of power back to Spain or Rome or Justinian,” 
just like it does not trace “the Federal Government’s source of 
power back to the English Parliament or to William the 
Conqueror or to King Arthur.”127  Instead, Justice Breyer 
posits, several “historical considerations” suggest that, by 
virtue of Public Law 600 and the creation of the 
Commonwealth Constitution in 1952, Congress “determined 
that the ‘political status’ of Puerto Rico would for double 
jeopardy purposes subsequently encompass the sovereign 
authority to enact and enforce—pursuant to its own powers—
its own criminal laws.”128 
 
III. PUERTO RICO V. FRANKLIN CALIFORNIA TAX-FREE 
TRUST: THE COMMONWEALTH’S PLEA TO GO 
BANKRUPT 
 
A. The Commonwealth’s Economic Struggle 
 
For many decades, the Commonwealth was sold by its 
supporters as “the best of both worlds,” a sort of Caribbean 
paradise with a healthy United States economy.  Usually 
characterized as the “Vitrina del Caribe” (loosely translated 
as “The Caribbean’s Window [to Latin America]”), the island 
served as a laboratory for American economic policies in the 
 
126 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
127 Id. at 1878 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
128 Id.  
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region decades before the Chicago Boys attempted the 
“Chilean Miracle” in the seventies.129  By the early 1940s, the 
combination of the last presidentially-imposed American 
governor in Puerto Rico, liberal Rexford Tugwell, and the rise 
of the Washington-friendly Luis Muñoz Marín as leader of the 
newly-created PDP led to a series of New Deal policies in 
Puerto Rico known as the Chardón Plan.130  Through the 
creation of many of the public corporations that remain in 
place today, the Puerto Rican government became the driving 
force behind the island’s economy by providing both the 
necessary infrastructure and the actual jobs for a big part of 
the population.  Although the Chardón Plan succeeded in 
providing better conditions for the Puerto Rican people, it was 
superseded in the 1950s by a different economic plan known 
as “Operación Manos a la Obra” (Operation Bootstrap).131  
This new strategy focused on incentivizing American private 
investment in Puerto Rico by providing tax exemptions like 
never before, so that companies would relocate to the island 
and create jobs.  Combined with the creation of the 
Commonwealth and the massive wave of government-
promoted emigration to the United States, mostly to New 
 
129 The Chilean Miracle refers primarily to the reorientation of the 
Chilean economy during dictator Augusto Pinochet’s military regime based 
on economic liberalization and privatization of state-owned corporations, 
designed by a group of Chilean economists trained by Milton Friedman at 
the University of Chicago known as “the Chicago Boys.”  Since then, many 
economists continually describe it as the model to follow for economic 
growth in Latin America and elsewhere.  See Bryce Breslin, Chile: 
Democracy and the Chilean Miracle, BERKELEY REV. OF LATIN AM. STUD., 
Fall 2007, http://clas.berkeley.edu/research/chile-democracy-and-chilean-
miracle [https://perma.cc/CK9H-V8TV]. 
130 Carlos E. Chardón Palacios was an influential Puerto Rican 
politician that held several important public positions during the period.  He 
served as Administrator of Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, 
Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico, and Executive Director of the 
Lands Authority, among others. 
131 The English name is said to have arisen from Luis Muñoz 
Marín’s statements to Congress in 1949 that “[we] are trying to lift ourselves 
by our own bootstraps.”  See Puerto Rico Constitution: Hearings H.R. 7674 
and S. 3336 Before the H. Comm. on Public Lands, 81st Cong. 1–32 (1950) 
(statement of Luis Muñoz-Marín, Governor of Puerto Rico). 
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York,132 the economy and the atmosphere of prosperity 
certainly grew during the fifties, and did so quickly.133  
 
Nothing exemplified the new economic mindset better 
than § 936 of the Internal Revenue Code.134  Congress enacted 
§ 936 in 1976 to give American companies an exemption from 
federal taxes on income, whether from operations or interests 
on local bank deposits, earned in Puerto Rico.  Section 936’s 
effects were felt immediately.  Many important American 
chemical, electrical, and pharmaceutical companies moved to 
Puerto Rico to take advantage of the tax incentives and the 
low wages that they could pay to a skilled, college-educated 
workforce.  The Commonwealth government could then use 
a local “tollgate tax” on the profits that these companies 
repatriated to the United States, thus strengthening its fisc.  
Indeed, for most of the second half of the 20th century, Puerto 
Rico enjoyed a standard of living relatively higher than many, 
if not most, Caribbean and South American countries.  
 
By the 1990s, § 936 had become increasingly 
unpopular in Washington, with many suggesting that it was 
simply a way for big corporations to avoid paying taxes.135  
Almost all sectors in Puerto Rico recognized that § 936’s repeal 
would have deleterious consequences on the island’s economy 
and hence strongly opposed its elimination; but some favored 
 
132 Hence the term “Nuyorican” to refer to those Puerto Ricans born 
and raised in New York since then.  Though the term may have been used 
pejoratively at some point, I do not believe that to be the case today, if ever.  
133 Scott Greenberg & Gavin Ekins, Tax Policy Helped Create 
Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Crisis (June 30, 2015), 
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/tax-policy-helped-create-puerto-rico-s-fiscal-
crisis [https://perma.cc/A5VD-RUHF]. 
134 Puerto Rico and Possession Tax Credit, Pub. L. No. 94-455, title 
X, § 1051(b), 90 Stat. 1643 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 936 (2014)). 
135 See Larry Rohter, Puerto Rico Fighting to Keep Its Tax Breaks 
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it anyway.136  Even more prevalant than the criticism of § 936 
as corporate welfare, was the call from pro-statehood Puerto 
Ricans to eliminate § 936 simply because it treated Puerto 
Rico differently than states.  In 1996, President Clinton signed 
the Small Business Job Creation Act, which phased out § 936 
over a period of ten years.137  Puerto Rican subsidiaries of 
United States businesses became subject to the same federal 
corporate income tax as any other subsidiary in 2006.138 
 
Since the phase out of § 936 and the signing of several 
important free-trade agreements between the United States 
and other nations, Puerto Rico’s economy has fallen into a 
deep recession.  The dominance of big American corporations 
in most industries suppressed any possibility of an 
autochthonous economy to fill the void after § 936’s repeal.  
While the tax base became smaller, the Commonwealth 
government continued to issue debt in order to function.  In 
1917, Congress determined that Commonwealth municipal 
bonds could not be taxed by either federal, state, or territorial 
governments,139 and investors kept buying them regardless of 
the island’s financial downturn.  According to official 
numbers, the Commonwealth’s deficit for the 2013–14 fiscal 
year reached $650 million.140  The combined deficit of the 
three main public utilities in fiscal year 2012–13 was 
approximately $800 million, and their overall combined debt 
reached $20 billion.141 
 
In order to address this reality, in June 2014, the 
Puerto Rican Legislature enacted the Puerto Rico Public 
 
136 Id. 
137 Small Business Job Creation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 
110 Stat. 1755. 
138 Id. 
139 Act of Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, § 3, 39 Stat. 953 (codified as 
amended at 48 U.S.C. § 745 (1917)).  
140 Brief for the Commonwealth at 5–6, Franklin Cal. Tax-Free 
Trust v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (2015) (No. 15-233). 
141 Id. 
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Corporations Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act,142 which 
established a mechanism that would allow its public utilities 
to restructure their debt.143 Creditors were not happy, and 
they challenged the statute in federal court the very day it was 
signed into law.144  
 
B. The Case in Federal Court 
 
1. The District Court 
 
Two groups of investors holding nearly two billion 
dollars in bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Electrical Power 
Authority (“PREPA”) filed separate suits against the 
Commonwealth, the Puerto Rico Government Development 
Bank (“GDB”), and several Commonwealth officials, seeking 
declaratory judgment that the Recovery Act was 
unconstitutional.145  They argued, primarily, that § 903(1) of 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code preempted the Recovery 
Act.146 
 
The main issue can be simplified as follows: Congress 
enacted the Bankruptcy Code,147 pursuant to its bankruptcy 
 
142 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71 [hereinafter “Recovery Act”]. 
143 Harvard Law Review, Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt 
Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 1320, 1320 (2015). 
144 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 
(2015). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 324–25.  Collectively, they also brought Contract Clause 
and Takings Clause claims, as well as challenges to the Recovery Act’s 
provisions that allow stays of federal court proceedings when a public 
corporation files for debt relief under the Act.  Although the district court 
reached the merits of these other claims, ruling mostly against the 
Commonwealth, the First Circuit did not address them in view of its holding 
on the preemption question.  Because they were not part of the case before 
the United States Supreme Court, they are irrelevant for purposes of this 
article.  Id. 
147 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 
2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. (2010)).  
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power under the Constitution.148  The Code prohibits states 
from filing for bankruptcy.149  Chapter 9 of the Code, however, 
allows states to authorize their “municipalities,” i.e., political 
subdivisions, public agencies, or instrumentalities of a state, 
to restructure their debt under that chapter.  Since the 
Bankruptcy Code was amended in 1984, the Code’s general 
definition of ‘‘state’’ expressly includes Puerto Rico, “except for 
the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under Chapter 
9.”150  Thus, it is undisputed that Puerto Rico’s municipalities, 
including PREPA, are excluded from filing for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 9.  The question is whether Puerto Rico’s 
exclusion from Chapter 9 in 1984 means that Congress 
intended the Commonwealth to be able to “fill the gap” by 
creating its own debt-restructuring mechanism for its 
municipalities—as the Commonwealth argued—or whether 
Congress intended to prohibit Puerto Rico from authorizing 
Chapter 9 relief or any other debt-restructuring mechanism—
as the plaintiffs argued.  
 
The district court held that the Recovery Act in its 
entirety was void pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution.151  Judge Francisco A. Besosa 
concluded that, by enacting § 903(1), Congress expressly 
preempted state laws that prescribe a method of composition 
of municipal indebtedness that binds nonconsenting 
creditors.152  Because § 101(52) of the Code provides that the 
term “State” includes Puerto Rico, and the Recovery Act would 
prescribe a method of composition of Commonwealth 
municipal indebtedness that would bind nonconsenting 
 
148 “The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish . . . uniform 
laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  
149 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (2010). 
150 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 421(j)(6) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) 
(2016). 
151 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, 85 F. Supp. 3d 577, 
583 (D.P.R. 2015).  
152 Id. at 596. 
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creditors, the court mechanically concluded that the statute 
could not survive.153  According to the court, the case was not 
a close one.154 
 
2. The First Circuit 
 
The First Circuit unanimously affirmed the lower 
court’s conclusion that § 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code 
preempted the Recovery Act.155  Through Judge Sandra L. 
Lynch, the majority explained that whether § 903(1) preempts 
the Recovery Act turns on whether the definition of “State” in 
the Federal Bankruptcy Code—as amended in 1984—renders 
§ 903(1)’s preemptive effect inapplicable to Puerto Rico.156  
The court held that it did not.157  
 
The court rejected what it deemed the 
Commonwealth’s “structural argument” that § 903(1) could 
not itself preempt Puerto Rico laws because it is a proviso to 
a provision within a chapter that does not apply to Puerto 
Rico.158  In the court’s view, however, “[t]he terms of § 101(52) 
do not exclude Puerto Rico municipalities from federal relief; 
rather, they deny to Puerto Rico the authority to decide when 
they might access it.”159  But the appellate court did not stop 
there, also holding that conflict preemption principles would 
invalidate the Recovery Act regardless of whether § 903(1) 
expressly did so.160 
 
The court continually emphasized Puerto Rico’s 
constitutional status as a territory of the United States 
subject to Congress’s plenary powers, something that it had 
 
153 Id. at 601. 
154 Id. 
155 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st 
Cir. 2015). 
156 Id. at 325. 
157 Id. at 337.  
158 Id. at 338.  
159 Id. at 343.  
160 Id. at 343–34. 
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been extremely reluctant to do since the creation of the 
Commonwealth.  For example, it rejected the 
Commonwealth’s claim that the canon of constitutional 
avoidance weighed against preemption in this case because 
that interpretation would raise a constitutional question 
under the Tenth Amendment, easily concluding that “the 
limits of the Tenth Amendment do not apply to Puerto Rico, 
which is ‘constitutionally a territory,’ because Puerto Rico’s 
powers are not ‘[those] reserved to the States’ but those 
specifically granted to it by Congress under its 
constitution.”161  Thus, with unambiguous language supported 
by a subtle citation to Torruella’s concurrence, the First 
Circuit seemed to signal that it, too, would have disregarded 
its holding in López Andino and held that the Commonwealth 
lacked sovereignty for double jeopardy purposes if the issue 
had reached the court again.  
 
The court admitted that the legislative history was 
“silent as to the reason for the exception set forth in the 1984 
amendment,”162 yet had no trouble suggesting that the silence 
cut against the Commonwealth, speculating that:  
 
One apparent possibility concerns the different 
constitutional status of Puerto Rico.  Because of 
this different status, the limitations on 
Congress’s ability to address municipal 
insolvency in the states discussed above are not 
directly applicable to Puerto Rico.  Accordingly, 
Congress may wish to adopt other—and 
possibly better—options to address the 
insolvency of Puerto Rico municipalities that 
are not available to it when addressing similar 
problems in the states.163 
 
161 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 805 F.3d at 344–45 (citing United 
States v. López Andino, 831 F.2d at 1172 (1st Cir. 1987) (Torruella, J., 
concurring)).  
162 Id. at 337.  
163 Id. (internal citations omitted).  
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And to make matters clearer, the court added that their 
statutory construction:  
 
is consistent with a congressional choice to 
exercise such other options ‘pursuant to the 
plenary powers conferred by the Territorial 
Clause.’  If Puerto Rico could determine the 
availability of Chapter 9 for Puerto Rico 
municipalities, that might undermine 
Congress’s ability to do so. Similarly, 
Congress’s ability to exercise such other options 
would also be undermined if Puerto Rico could 
fashion its own municipal bankruptcy relief.  
The 1984 amendment ensures that these 
options remain open to Congress by denying 
Puerto Rico the power to do either.164 
 
Judge Torruella again issued an important concurring opinion 
for purposes of this Article.  He agreed that the Recovery Act 
contravened § 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code and thus could 
not survive.165  However, the concurring judge went much 
further, holding that the 1984 amendment, by which Puerto 
Rico was included as a “State” but excluded from Chapter 9 
relief, was also unconstitutional—an argument that the 
Commonwealth did not have reason to advance because it was 
seeking to uphold the validity of its own statute and its 
municipalities never filed for Chapter 9 relief.166  Thus, the 
pro-statehood judge would have applied federal law as it 
existed prior to the 1984 amendments to grant Puerto Rico the 
opportunity to allow its municipalities to participate in 
Chapter 9 proceedings.  Like Chief Justice Fiol Matta in 
Sánchez Valle, the case was too significant for Torruella to 
simply agree with one side while leaving other important 
questions unanswered, even if it meant invalidating a federal 
 
164 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
165 Id. (Torruella, J., concurring). 
166 Id. 
122 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 7:1 
 
provision whose constitutionality no party directly 
challenged.  
 
In the last part of his opinion, entitled “The ‘Business-
as-Usual’ Colonial Treatment Continues,” Judge Torruella 
accused the United States of engaging in blatant colonialism: 
 
The majority’s disregard for the arbitrary and 
unreasonable nature of the legislation enacted 
in the 1984 Amendments showcases again this 
court’s approval of a relationship under which 
Puerto Rico lacks any national political 
representation in both Houses of Congress and 
is wanting of electoral rights for the offices of 
President and Vice-President.  That 
discriminatory relationship allows 
legislation—such as the 1984 Amendments—to 
be enacted and applied to the millions of 
[United States] citizens residing in Puerto Rico 
without their participation in the democratic 
process.  This is clearly a colonial relationship, 
one which violates our Constitution and the 
Law of the Land as established in ratified 
treaties.  Given the vulnerability of these 
citizens before the political branches of 
government, it is a special duty of the courts of 
the United States to be watchful in their 
defense.  As the Supreme Court pronounced in 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 
“prejudice against . . . insular minorities may 
be a special condition, which tends seriously to 
curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.”167  I am sorry to say this special duty 
to perform a ‘more searching inquiry’ has been 
 
167 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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woefully and consistently shirked by this court 
when it comes to Puerto Rico, with the majority 
opinion just being the latest in a series of such 
examples.  
 
When the economic crisis arose, after 
considering Congress’s cryptic revocation of 
Puerto Rico’s powers to manage its own 
internal affairs through the 1984 Amendments, 
Puerto Rico looked elsewhere for a solution.  It 
developed the Recovery Act enacted pursuant 
to the police powers this very court had 
sustained, to fill the black hole left by the 1984 
Amendments introducing of the definition now 
codified in § 101(52).  And while I agree with 
the majority that Puerto Rico could not take 
this step because [C]hapter 9 applies to Puerto 
Rico in its entirety, I commend the 
Commonwealth for seeking ways to resolve its 
predicament.  
 
Even if one ignores the uncertain outcome of 
any proposed legislation, questions still 
remain: why would Congress intentionally take 
away a remedy from Puerto Rico that it had 
before 1984 and leave it at the sole mercy of its 
creditors?  What legitimate purpose can such 
an action serve, other than putting Puerto 
Rico’s creditors in a position that no other 
creditors enjoy in the United States?  While 
favoring particular economic interests—i.e., 
Puerto Rico creditors—to the detriment of 
three-and-half million [United States] citizens, 
is perhaps ‘business as usual’ in some political 
circles, one would think it hardly qualifies as a 
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rational constitutional basis for such 
discriminatory legislation.168 
 
Though strongly denouncing colonialism, Torruella never 
referred to Puerto Rico as a nation, instead continually 
stressing the importance of safeguarding the rights of the 
“three-and-a-half million [United States] citizens residing 
therein.” 
 
C. The Case Before the United States Supreme 
Court 
 
The Commonwealth filed its petition for Writ of 
Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on August 25, 
2015, which the Court granted on December 4, 2015.  Even 
after the federal government filed its brief in Sánchez Valle, it 
was unclear which position the Obama administration would 
assume in this second case.  
 
As it turned out, the Obama administration did not 
take a position.  The Department of Justice did not appear 
before the Court as an intervenor or an amicus in favor of 
either party.  Instead, while the case was briefed, argued, and 
submitted, the third branch of the federal government showed 
up.  In April 2016, the Committee on Natural Resources of the 
House of Representatives169 introduced “a Bill to establish an 
Oversight Board to assist the Government of Puerto Rico, 
including its instrumentalities, in managing its public 
finances, and for other purposes,” called the Puerto Rico 
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act 
 
168 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 805 F.3d at 355–56 (emphasis 
added) (internal citations omitted). 
169 In yet another “peculiar” aspect of the relationship between 
Puerto Rico and the United States, the House Committee on Natural 
Resources is in charge of handling matters regarding the island.  See STAFF 
OF H. COMM. ON NATURAL RESOURCES, Rule X of the Rules of the U.S. House 
of Representatives, 114th Cong., 
http://naturalresources.house.gov/about/jurisdiction.htm 
[https://perma.cc/D5KP-4CXA]. 
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(“PROMESA,” quite insultingly).170  After the Junta-imposing 
PROMESA was introduced,171 many believed that the Court 
would delay issuing an opinion because the bill could moot the 
case if Congress passed any Chapter 9-like process.  
 
In a strange “coincidence,” the same day in which the 
Court decided Sánchez Valle to disperse any lingering doubts 
as to the Commonwealth’s lack of sovereignty as a United 
States territory,172 the House of Representatives passed 
PROMESA expressly relying on Congress’s plenary powers 
under the territorial clause.173  The Court decided Puerto Rico 
v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust on the following 
scheduled opinion day, affirming judgment by a five to two 
vote.174 
 
In an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court 
found that “[t]he plain text of the Bankruptcy Code begins and 
 
170 Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability 
Act of 2016 (PROMESA), H.R. 4900, 114th Cong. (2016). 
171 Although it does much more than that, PROMESA imposes a 
fiscal control Board (“Junta de Control Fiscal”), whose members, unelected 
by Puerto Ricans, would have authority to rule over the island unrestricted 
by the Commonwealth Constitution.  It is the first time that Congress has 
attempted to directly govern Puerto Rico’s “internal affairs” since the 
creation of the Commonwealth.  Id. 
172 On June 9, 2016, the author had the “privilege” of being present 
when the Court reiterated that Puerto Rico remained a territory subject to 
Congress’s plenary powers during the morning and when the House used 
that plenary power to impose a Junta over “its property” during the 
afternoon. 
173 The Senate passed PROMESA on June 29, 2016.  
See PROMESA, S. 2328, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016).  President 
Obama signed it into law the following day.  See PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 
114-187.  On August 31, 2016, the President announced the members of 
PROMESA’s Junta and thus single-handedly appointed Puerto Rico’s new 
government: Andrew G. Biggs; José B. Carrión III; Carlos M. García; Arthur 
J. González; José R. González; Ana J. Matosantos; and David A. Skeel, Jr.  
The Junta became effective the next day.  It met for the first time on 
September 30, 2016, in Wall Street, and elected José B. Carrión III as its 
president.  
174 Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 
(2016). 
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ends” the analysis.175  Because the Code’s definition of “State” 
includes Puerto Rico176 and the Recovery Act is a statute 
prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness that may 
bind nonconsenting creditors, the Court concluded that the 
Recovery Act could not survive. 
 
“By excluding Puerto Rico ‘for purposes of defining who 
may be a debtor under Chapter 9,’” the majority explained, 
“the Code prevents Puerto Rico from authorizing its 
municipalities to seek Chapter 9 relief,” “[b]ut Puerto Rico 
remains a ‘State’ for other purposes of Chapter 9, including 
that chapter’s pre-emption provision.”177  “Had Congress 
intended to alter this fundamental detail of municipal 
bankruptcy,” the Court asserted, “we would expect the text of 
the amended definition to say so.  Congress, does not, one 
might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”178 
 
The Court was not persuaded by the Commonwealth’s 
structural argument that it would be “nonsensical” to hold 
that a provision contained in a chapter of the Code that “does 
not apply” to Puerto Rico nonetheless preempts one of its 
statutes.  The Court replied saying that the argument “rests 
on the faulty assumption that Puerto Rico is, ‘by definition,’ 
excluded from Chapter 9” when “it is not.”179  
 
The Court never referred to Puerto Rico as a nation.  
Instead, it reiterated for the second time in five days what it 
had been reluctant to express clearly for decades: Puerto Rico 
remained a Territory of the United States uninterruptedly 
since 1898.180  The term “colony” was also absent from the 
opinion.  Judge Torruella’s accusations of colonialism were 
 
175 Id. at 1946. 
176 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2016). 
177 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1942. 
178 Id. at 1947 (brackets and internal citations omitted). 
179 Id. at 1941. 
180 Id. at 1945 (“The Third provision of the Bankruptcy Code at 
issue is the definition of ‘State,’ which has included Puerto Rico since it 
became a Territory of the United States in 1898”). 
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simply ignored, just like his call to invalidate the 1984 
simultaneous inclusion-exclusion of Puerto Rico for Chapter 9 
purposes.181   
 
Justice Sotomayor issued a dissenting opinion, which 
Justice Ginsburg joined.  In their view, “[t]he structure of the 
Code and the language and purpose of § 903 demonstrate that 
Puerto Rico’s municipal debt restructuring law should not be 
read to be prohibited by Chapter 9.”182  Read “in context,” 
Sotomayor found, “Section 903 by its terms presupposes that 
Chapter 9 applies only to States who have the power to 
authorize their municipalities to invoke is protection” and 
“[b]ecause Puerto Rico’s municipalities cannot pass through 
the § 109(c) gateway to Chapter 9, nothing in the operation of 
a Chapter 9 case affects Puerto Rico’s control over its 
municipalities.”183 
 
Responding to the majority’s assertion that “Congress 
‘does not, one  might say, hide elephants in mouseholes,’” 
Sotomayor accused the Court of ignoring “that Congress 
already altered the fundamental details of municipal 
bankruptcy when it amended the definition of ‘State’ to 
exclude Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to 
take advantage of Chapter 9” without even explaining why it 
did so.184  In her view, then, it is undisputed that Congress did 
hide an elephant in a mousehole; the question is what it 
intended by doing so.  “Finding pre-emption here,” she 
concluded, “means that a government is left powerless and 
with no legal process to help its 3.5 million citizens.”185 
 
The dissent did not use the words “nation” or “colony” 
either, nor did it refer to those 3.5 million citizens as an 
insular minority of United States citizens who just so happen 
 
181 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322, 346 
(1st Cir. 2015) (Torruella, J., concurring) 
182 Id. at 1949. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
183 Id. at 1952, 
184 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1953. 
185 Id. at 1954 (emphasis added). 
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to inhabit an unincorporated territory belonging to the United 
States Congress.  In fact, the term “territory” did not make it 
into Justice Sotomayor’s opinion.  
 
IV. SOLIDIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL COLONIALISM: THE 
INTERPLAY BETWEEN LEGAL FICTION AND SOCIAL 
REALITY 
 
The combination of these two decisions illustrates 
perfectly why Puerto Rico remains a 21st century colony of the 
United States.  Because of the unique test used in Sánchez 
Valle to determine whether a jurisdiction is worthy of 
recognition as a sovereign under the dual sovereignty 
doctrine, i.e., whether that jurisdiction derives its powers from 
the same ultimate source, the Court could not—or did not 
want to—adopt the “Puerto-Rico-is-kind-of-like-a-state” 
rationale that many courts usually employ to avoid the status 
issue.  Instead, the Court directly addressed the great 
historical question and rejected the Commonwealth 
supporters’ claim, stating as clearly as it ever has that “[t]he 
island’s Constitution, significant though it is, d[id] not break 
the chain.”186  And because this is so, it was not difficult to 
predict that the Court would reject the Commonwealth’s 
“Congress-could-not-possibly-have-intended-this” claim in 
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust.  The Court’s response 
was straightforward: Congress could and it did because 
Puerto Rico is a territory and as such is subject to its plenary 
powers.  And that, through a bill that supersedes the 
Commonwealth’s non-sovereign Constitution, Congress was 
already taking action to handle Puerto Rico’s municipal debts. 
 
If one adopts a more cynical (perhaps a “realist 
approach” would be more fair) view of the Court’s way of 
deciding controversies, it is not difficult to understand the 
outcome of these cases.  By telling Commonwealth supporters 
that they indeed fell for a “monumental hoax”187 in 1952 in 
 
186 Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1867. 
187 Figueroa, 232 F.2d at 620. 
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Sánchez Valle, conservative Justices solidified Congress’s 
power to do with the territories whatever it wants, while 
liberals expanded a constitutional protection for criminal 
defendants in Puerto Rico.  Especially considering the position 
of the United States, a “government liberal” like Justice 
Kagan was not likely to vote differently; neither was a more 
“activist liberal” like Justice Ginsburg.  
 
This view is buttressed by the concurrences: Justice 
Thomas would deny recognition as a sovereign to Indian 
tribes, as well, while Justice Ginsburg would overrule the 
whole dual-sovereignty doctrine altogether.  Since oral 
argument, it was clear that Justice Sotomayor was 
sympathetic to the Commonwealth’s argument.  Though she 
could be characterized as much an “activist liberal” as Justice 
Ginsburg, she could not ignore the significance of the Court’s 
reasoning over the Puerto Rican people’s right to organize 
themselves as a political entity.  Thus, criminal defendants’ 
rights would have to suffer this time, even if one would expect 
her to join Justice Ginsburg if the Court ever revisited the 
dual-sovereignty doctrine.  And Justice Breyer, perhaps the 
Court’s quintessential “government liberal,” also voted as one 
would have expected in the first case.  As a First Circuit judge 
from 1980 to 1994,188 no other Justice has dealt with more 
cases arising from Puerto Rico.  During that period, then-
Chief Judge Breyer certainly subscribed to what Torruella 
called the First Circuit’s “long-lasting Commonwealth-
endorsing caselaw.”189  
 
Once the collective right of the People of Puerto Rico 
versus the individual rights of criminal defendants dichotomy 
is taken out of the picture in Franklin California Tax-Free 
Trust, the Justices’ votes are even easier to predict, 
notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s departure and Justice Alito’s 
 
188 Then-Chief Judge Breyer was succeeded by Judge Torruella.  
189 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 805 F.3d at 346. 
130 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 7:1 
 
recusal from the case.190  Conservatives voted to protect 
bondholders—the overwhelming majority of which are 
Americans—based on the statute’s clear text; “government 
liberals” joined them because the law was simply too clear to 
ignore, even though the fiscal and economic consequences on 
the Puerto Rican people would be disastrous, thus implicitly 
siding with the conspicuously missing United States; and the 
more “activist liberals” dissented based on the statute’s 
structure, context, and consequences over the people of Puerto 
Rico and in favor of creditors.  
 
Analyzed together, Sánchez Valle and Franklin 
California Tax-Free Trust are two sides of the same ugly coin; 
two nails in the Commonwealth’s coffin.  Only because of the 
former’s holding can the latter’s holding be so easily reached.  
In other words, because the Court continues to view Puerto 
Rico as a mere possession of Congress subject to its plenary 
powers (cause), the fact that a federal statute expressly denied 
the Commonwealth the opportunity to do what any sovereign 
country or any state of the Union can, is legally irrelevant 
(effect).  
 
 To be sure, the Court did include seemingly 
Commonwealth-endorsing language in Sánchez Valle.  For 
example, the Court stressed that “for double jeopardy 
purposes,” it “asks a narrow, historically focused question” 
and that “[t]he inquiry does not turn, as the term ‘sovereignty’ 
sometimes suggests, on the degree to which the second entity 
is autonomous from the first or set its own political course.”191  
It also stated that “[t]ruth be told . . . ‘sovereignty’ in this 
context does not bear its ordinary meaning”192 and that “the 
 
190 It is widely believed that Justice Alito held Puerto Rico bonds 
and thus decided to recuse himself to avoid a conflict of interest.  See Greg 
Stohr & Michelle Kaske, Scalia, Alito Court Absences Shape Puerto Rico 
Debt-Relief Bid, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (March 21, 2016), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-03-21/scalia-alito-court-
absences-shape-puerto-rico-debt-relief-bid [https://perma.cc/UK6X-RDPX].  
191Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1867. 
192 Id. at 1870. 
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inquiry [despite its label] does not probe whether a 
government possesses the usual attributes, or acts in the 
common manner, of a sovereign entity”193 and that “Puerto 
Rico today has a distinctive, indeed exceptional, status as a 
self-governing Commonwealth,”194 even going as far as saying 
that “the United States and Puerto Rico have forged a unique 
political relationship, built on the island’s evolution into a 
constitutional democracy.”195 
 
I do not doubt that some people will hang on to these 
remarks for the proposition that the Commonwealth is not yet 
dead, or that the Court could use them to resuscitate it by 
resorting to the usual “Puerto-Rico-is-sort-of-like-a-state” 
argument, should it be necessary in a future case.  But the 
Court’s and the United States government’s actions speak 
louder than its words, and, in these cases, some words speak 
much louder than others.  
 
What other questions need be answered before one can 
conclude that Puerto Rico is a colony of the United States, if 
one accepts, as the Court correctly concluded, that Puerto 
Rico’s Constitution “[did] not break the chain”196 or that its 
ultimate source of power “[lies] in federal soil”?197  In what 
world can a jurisdiction be both a constitutional democracy 
and an unincorporated possession subject to the plenary 
powers of a legislative assembly in which that jurisdiction’s 
members are not represented?  Only in the fictional world of 
the Insular Cases. 
 
Professor Efrén Rivera Ramos brilliantly explained 
that, through the Insular Cases, the United States Supreme 
Court created a new “discursive universe” in order to 
legitimize United States expansionism at the turn of the 20th 
 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 1874 (emphasis added). 
195 Id. at 1868. 
196 Id. at 1876. 
197 Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1868. 
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century.198  The same ideas of American superiority and White 
supremacy that gave us Dred Scott v. Sandford199 and Plessy 
v. Ferguson200201 led the Court to construct a “legal identity” 
for “Porto Rico” and “its inhabitants” that never coincided 
with the island’s social reality or that of its people.  
 
 In keeping with this legal fiction, the United States 
Reports would never reflect that the United States invaded 
Puerto Rico on July 25, 1898 to take military control of the 
island, after Spain allegedly bombed the U.S.S. Maine.  
Instead, they would state that, on December 10, 1898, Spain 
“ceded” its colonies—Puerto Rico, Guam, and the 
Philippines—to the United States in exchange for $20 
million.202  As Justice Kagan stated in Puerto Rico v. Sánchez 
Valle, the treaty that secured this deal also “tasked Congress 
with determining ‘[t]he civil rights and political status’ of 
 
198 See RIVERA RAMOS, supra note 66, at 127.  
199 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that black 
persons were not, and could never be, U.S. citizens because the Framers 
never considered them part of “the People of the United States,” and that 
the federal government had no power to regulate slavery in the federal 
territories acquired after the creation of the United States) superseded by 
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII-XIV. 
200 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the 
constitutionality of state laws requiring racial segregation in public 
facilities under the “separate but equal” doctrine), overruled by Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
201 Several commentators have noted the correlation between 
Plessy and the Insular Cases.  See, e.g., TORRUELLA, supra note 66.  Much 
less has been written, however, about the correlation between the Insular 
Cases and Dred Scott, which I believe is more enlightening.  The latter not 
only spoke extensively about the territories, but its treatment of black 
people as property is more similar to the treatment of Puerto Rico as a mere 
possession, than is Plessy’s separate-but-equal fiasco, on which pro-
statehood commentators who conceive themselves as Americans like to rely.  
See, e.g., The Enduring Legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson in Puerto Rico, PUERTO 
RICO REPORT (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.puertoricoreport.com/the-enduring-
legacy-of-plessy-v-ferguson-in-puerto-rico/ [https://perma.cc/9F4F-H7RL]. 
202 Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1868. 
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[Puerto Rico’s] inhabitants.”203  The fact that Puerto Ricans 
took no part in this real estate transaction did not matter.204 
 
But because the United States could not have colonies, 
of course, what was a European colony one day magically 
turned into an “unincorporated territory” overnight.  Its 
people would never be referred to as a Latin American nation, 
but as mere “inhabitants.”  Through the “territorial clause,” 
which grants Congress power to “dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or 
other Property belonging to the United States,”205 the Court 
would constitutionally legitimize the “acquisition” (by 
conquest and purchase) of “distant possessions”206 and the 
political and legal subordination of the “alien races”;207 “alien 
and hostile people”;208 and “distant ocean communities of a 
different origin and language from those of our continental 
people”209 that inhabited them.210 
 
203 Id. (quoting Treaty of Peace Between the United States and 
Spain, Spain-United States, art. 9, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1759 (1898)). 
204 Ironically, in order to assuage the Cuban independence 
movement, which was in the middle of its second Independence War against 
Spain, in 1897 the European power had “granted” the Carta Autonómica to 
both islands, under which Puerto Ricans had more representation in the 
Spanish legislative body than we have ever had in Congress.  See JOSÉ TRÍAS 
MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD 
(1997). 
205 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
206 Downes, 182 U.S. at 282. 
207 Id. at 287. 
208 Id. at 308. 
209 Balzac, 258 U.S. at 311. 
210 Perhaps no one has explained the Court’s treatment of Puerto 
Rico and Puerto Ricans in the Insular Cases more eloquently than the 
Attorney General of the United States in Downes: 
 
We must not forget that “territory belonging to 
the United States” is the common property of the 
United States and is to be administered at the 
common expense and for the common benefit of 
the States united, who jointly, as a governing 
entity, own it. 
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Not one Justice questioned the legitimacy of the 
exercise of United States sovereignty over Puerto Rico, even 
though they themselves recognized that Puerto Ricans had 
never consented to it.  Instead, the original divide was 
between those Justices who would have “annexed” the 
acquired property completely, thus granting (never 
“imposing”) the new “dependent peoples” all the protections of 
the Constitution, and those Justices who strongly feared the 
consequences of such action.  Ultimately, the latter group won 
and the “unincorporated territory”—nowhere found in the 
Constitution—was invented.  Justice Brown explained the 
Court’s rationale as follows in Downes: 
 
It is obvious that in the annexation of outlying 
and distant possessions grave questions will 
arise from differences of race, habits, laws and 
customs of the people, and from differences of 
soil, climate and production, which may require 
 
Porto Rico [sic] and the Philippines were not won 
by arms and taken over by treaty through the 
effort or influence or at the expense of its 
inhabitants, but through the might of the United 
States, upon their demand and upon their 
contribution of $20,000,000 to Spain, and upon 
the assumption by treaty of solemn national 
obligations which the United States, not the 
islands or their inhabitants, are bound to observe 
and keep. 
 
The inhabitants of the islands are not joint 
partners with the States in their transaction.  
 
The islands are “territory belonging to the United 
States,” not a part of the United States. The 
islands were the things acquired by the treaty; 
the United States were the party who acquired 
them, and to whom they belong. The owner and 
the thing owned are not the same. 
 
See RIVERA RAMOS, supra note 66, at 114 (quoting De Lima, 182 U.S. 
at 102 (emphasis added)). 
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action on the part of Congress that would be 
quite unnecessary in the annexation of 
contiguous territory inhabited only by people of 
the same race, or by scattered bodies of native 
Indians. 
 
. . . . 
 
A false step at this time might be fatal to the 
development of what Chief Justice Marshall 
called the American Empire.  Choice in some 
cases, the natural gravitation of small bodies 
toward large ones in others, the result of a 
successful war in still others, may bring about 
conditions, which would render the annexation 
of distant possessions desirable.  If those 
possessions are inhabited by alien races, 
differing from us in religion, customs, laws, 
methods of taxation and modes of thought, the 
administration of government and justice, 
according to Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a 
time be impossible, and the question at once 
arises whether large concessions ought not be 
made for a time that ultimately our theories 
may be carried out, and the blessings of a free 
government under the Constitution extended 
to them.211 
 
Unfortunately, this legal fiction’s “constitutive effect”212 has 
not only gotten stronger over the years, but is also now the 
very “objective” source from which the Executive, Legislative, 
and Judicial branches continue to justify the exercise of 
American sovereignty over Puerto Rico.213  Indeed, though the 
 
211 RIVERA RAMOS, supra note 66, at 112 (quoting Downes, 182 U.S. 
at 282, 286–87). 
212 Id. at 121–42. 
213 Professor Rivera Ramos referred to the Court’s methodological 
approach throughout the Insular Cases as “instrumental eclecticism”: 
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Court did not mention them, these are the shameful 
precedents that Sánchez Valle and Franklin California Tax-
Free Trust implicitly, but necessarily, validate.  
 
Even without express racial and imperialist 
statements, the Court’s interpretation of Congress’s 
treatment towards Puerto Rico in Sánchez Valle is 
patronizing and disrespectful to Puerto Ricans.  Like their 
predecessors, the majority validated Congress’s plenary 
power to do with Puerto Rico as Congress wishes, based on an 
international treaty in which Puerto Ricans took no part.  
Puerto Rico is still not a nation in the United States Reports.  
The Court was very careful when referring to the island and 
its members.  It is still safer, both politically and legally, to 
resort to phrases like “People of Puerto Rico” or the “citizens 
residing therein” because the limbo that is the territorial 
Commonwealth does not clearly allow the unambiguous use of 
the terms “Americans” (although “American citizens” is 
accepted as a legal reality) or “Puerto Ricans” (as a distinct 
national community under international law as opposed to 
merely persons residing on the island) when referring to the 
inhabitants of this particular land.214 
 
The alternation from a predominantly 
instrumentalist and contextualized 
interpretative technique in the 1901 decisions to 
a largely formalist approach in the second group 
of cases and back to instrumentalism and 
contextualism in Balzac provides a picture of a 
strategy of interpretation that is, ultimately, 
profoundly instrumentalist. In effect, this 
strategy of contextual selection of interpretative 
techniques—evident in those shifts as well as in 
the intermingling of approaches within some of 
the opinions themselves—can best be described 
as instrumental eclecticism. 
 
Id. at 108 (internal citation omitted). 
214 After all these years, it appears that the Court still treats Puerto 
Rico as “foreign in the domestic sense.”  CHRISTINA DUFFY BURNETT & BURKE 
MARSHALL, FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN 
EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (2001). 
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Absent from the Court’s historical account in Sánchez 
Valle was that the island was under direct United States 
military rule from 1898 to 1900.215  The Foraker Act of 1900 
would later “establish” (not “impose”) a civil government in 
which the United States President appointed the governor, 
the whole Supreme Court, and the upper house of the 
Legislature.216  As the Court correctly pointed out, “[f]ederal 
statutes generally applied in Puerto Rico.”217  The fact that 
Puerto Ricans never consented to such colonial subordination 
is still irrelevant to the Court a century later.  
 
Then came the Jones Act of 1917, by which “Congress 
granted Puerto Rico additional autonomy” and “gave” (not 
“imposed” onto) “the island’s inhabitants United States 
citizenship” (without acknowledging any sort of Puerto Rican 
internationally-recognized citizenship) and “replaced the 
upper house of the legislature with a popularly elected 
senate.”218  Puerto Ricans took no part in this process either.  
And Puerto Rico would have to wait until 1947 to elect its own 
governor, when Congress magnanimously “empowered the 
Puerto Rican people to elect their own governor, a right never 
before accorded in a [United States] territory.”219 
 
Finally, the Court reached Public Law 600 of 1950 and 
the creation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico through the 
adoption of its Constitution on July 25, 1952, exactly fifty-four 
years after the United States Navy invaded Puerto Rico in 
 
215 To put things in perspective, the official military occupation of 
Iraq after Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was followed by the 
establishment of the Iraq Interim Governing Council in 2004; less time than 
it took the U.S. military to establish a “civil” government in Puerto Rico in 
1900.  See KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31339, IRAQ: U.S. 
REGIME CHANGE EFFORTS AND POST-SADDAM GOVERNANCE (2004); Library of 
Congress, Chronology of Puerto Rico in the Spanish-American War, 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/chronpr.html [https://perma.cc/5D53-
KAUS]. 
216 Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1868. 
217 Id. (emphasis added). 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
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1898.220  Amazingly, the majority in Sánchez Valle somewhat 
endorsed the traditional Commonwealth-supporting 
discourse according to which Puerto Ricans supposedly 
consented, while rejecting its most basic premise: that it was 
an act of sovereignty through which the Puerto Rican nation 
engaged in a process of self-determination.  Indeed, the Court 
had its cake and ate it too. 
 
The truth is that many Puerto Ricans did not 
participate in what they recognized as a hoax that would not 
alter the island’s legal subordination to Congress.221  It is also 
true that the majority of Puerto Ricans who participated 
undoubtedly voted in favor of the Constitution, and thus the 
creation of the Estado Libre Asociado. 222  But what exactly did 
 
220 July 25 is a very significant date in Puerto Rican history: United 
States forces invaded Puerto Rico on July 25, 1898; the Commonwealth was 
created on July 25, 1952; and the Cerro Maravilla Massacre occurred on 
July 25, 1978.  The Cerro Maravilla Massacre is the name given by the 
Puerto Rican public and media to the events that transpired that day at 
Cerro Maravilla, a mountain in Puerto Rico, wherein two young pro-
independence activists were murdered in a police ambush.  The event 
sparked a series of political controversies where, in the end, the police 
officers were found guilty of murder and several high-ranking local 
government officials were accused of planning and/or covering up the 
incident.  See Laura Rivera Melendez, Romero: Mistake to Call Police 
“Heroes” in Cerro Maravilla, http://www.puertorico-
herald.org/issues/2003/vol7n38/RomeroMistake-en.html 
[https://perma.cc/CE5L-7JDM].  
221 According to Report 82-1832 of the United States House of 
Representatives, 41.61% of registered voters did not participate in the 
March 3, 1952 plebiscite to adopt or reject the Commonwealth Constitution. 
H.R. REP. NO. 82-1832, at 1896 (1952). 
222 The PDP and the statehood parties then in existence called for 
their supporters to vote in favor of the adoption of the Constitution; the PIP 
called for a vote to reject it.  Of those who participated, 81.88% voted in 
favor.  Pedro Albizu Campos and the Nationalist Party called on their 
followers to abstain and had even organized an armed insurrection less than 
two years earlier in order to denounce what they already perceived as 
another colonial organic charter.  As one would expect the United States 
government to do in those circumstances, the rebellion was quickly 
suppressed and its followers both prosecuted and persecuted.  Thus, while 
the constitutional convention was taking place, not only did independence 
supporters boycott it, but many of their leaders were actually incarcerated. 
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they consent to?  They consented to what the Commonwealth 
argued in Sánchez Valle, which the Court rejected.  They 
consented to what they mistakenly believed was a [s]overeign 
creature unbound by Congress’s plenary power to handle its 
internal affairs, not one that lacks sovereignty even to 
criminally prosecute its people; one that Congress can 
mistreat statutorily by denying its municipalities the ability 
to restructure their debts; or one over which Congress can 
impose PROMESA’s undemocratic Junta notwithstanding its 
Constitution’s text.  And they consented under the impression 
that something different was going on.  It was precisely that 
generalized mistaken understanding that moved the United 
Nations to remove Puerto Rico from the list of nations that 
had not exercised their right to self-determination under 
international law in 1953 at the behest of the United States 
and Commonwealth supporters.223 
 
Puerto Ricans never freely consented to the 
Commonwealth as described by the Court.  And even if that 
were not the case, it is undisputed that neither independence 
nor statehood was ever “offered” to the Puerto Rican people.  
Thus, to use the approval of the Constitution as an excuse to 
legitimize the exercise of American sovereignty over the 
 
 
223 José A. Delgado, Puerto Rico’s Case Before the UN, EL NUEVO 
DÍA, 
http://www.elnuevodia.com/english/english/nota/puertoricoscasebeforetheu
n-2212546/ [https://perma.cc/Q5PK-NNEF].  Since 1953, independence 
supporters (and those who advocate for a sovereign Commonwealth) have 
continually asked the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations to 
intervene on the matter and to put Puerto Rico back on the “colonies list.”  
So have a few statehood supporters, albeit they prefer to look to Congress 
for a solution.  Meanwhile, the United States has done nothing.  In what is 
truly unprecedented, as soon as the United States filed its brief in Sánchez 
Valle, and again after the Court issued its decision, Governor Alejandro 
García Padilla, an avid Commonwealth supporter of the most orthodox wing 
of the PDP, turned to the U.N. to denounce what he believed was a historical 
change of position by the United States in favor of pure colonialism.  See 
also Andre Lee Muñiz, Puerto Rico’s Colonial Case in the United Nations, 
LA RESPUESTA (Aug. 17, 2014), http://larespuestamedia.com/puerto-ricos-
colonial-case-in-the-united-nations/ [https://perma.cc/QZ7T-3FAX]. 
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island is quite fantastic, considering that the Commonwealth 
was nothing more than a take-it-or-leave-it offer that did not 
change Congress’s authority over the island.  Under those 
circumstances, should Commonwealth supporters—and 
Puerto Ricans in general—be faulted for preferring the 
enactment of a Bill of Rights and a Constitution that would 
fictitiously grant them a greater level of autonomy and 
stronger individual rights over the more-direct colonial 
regime of the Jones Act of 1917?  One would hardly think so.   
 
More importantly, even if those Puerto Ricans had 
happily consented to a non-sovereign, unincorporated 
territorial Commonwealth (i.e., a colony), it is truly 
mindboggling how said “compact”—and, again, the Court 
finally admitted that it was not—has been able to survive for 
more than six decades either under American constitutional 
law or under the most basic principles of human rights under 
international law.  Puerto Rico is a colony not merely because 
Puerto Ricans, whether “foreign nationals” or “real 
Americans,” have never in 118 years procedurally consented 
to such a degrading treatment in a congressionally-binding 
legal process,224 but also because Puerto Rico, and Puerto 
 
224 Since 1952, Congress has not taken any action with regard to 
the status of Puerto Rico.  During the same period, there have been four 
referendums on the island.  The (mistakenly-believed [s]overeign) 
Commonwealth option won in 1967 and 1993.  NPP Governor Pedro Rosselló 
González attempted his second referendum in 1998, this time leaving out 
the Commonwealth option that he believed colonial in nature.  
Commonwealth supporters sued and the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, still 
“controlled” by PDP-appointed Justices, ordered that a “None of the Above” 
fifth column be added to the options.  Commonwealth supporters voted for 
that option, which was understood to be the (still-mistakenly-believed 
[s]overeign) Commonwealth, and won the referendum.   
In 2012, NPP Governor Luis Fortuño passed yet another 
referendum, this time consisting of a two-part process: the first question 
asked whether one wished to maintain the island’s territorial status (in 
which the “No” won) and the second question asked one to choose between 
statehood, independence, and a sovereign nation in free association with the 
United States (in which “statehood” received the most votes).  As usual, 
Commonwealth supporters criticized the referendum as biased and did not 
acknowledge its results.  After Sánchez Valle was decided, there has been 
No. 2:80]          PUERTO RICO BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 141 
 
Ricans, are substantively subordinated to the United States.  
Federal regulations apply in Puerto Rico exactly as if it were 
a state of the Union, but Puerto Ricans do not vote for the 
President or the Vice President.  The District Court for the 
District of Puerto Rico interprets and applies federal law over 
Puerto Ricans (except when they “do not apply”) even though 
an Executive that they do not elect appoints their judges.  
Federal law applies today because Congress said so a century 
ago, notwithstanding the fact that Puerto Ricans do not elect 
Senators or Representatives; instead, we elect one “Resident 
Commissioner” who sits on the House of Representatives, but 
does not vote.225  No court in 2016 should continue to 
constitutionally validate such a degrading colonial 
relationship under the guise that it was consented to by some.  
 
V. BREAKING THE CHAIN: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 
 
 It is clear that the real problem underlying Sánchez 
Valle and Franklin California Tax-Free Trust is not merely 
Puerto Rico’s lack of [s]overeignty to criminally prosecute or 
Congress’s different statutory treatment towards the island 
under the Bankruptcy Code, but the degrading colonial 
relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States that 
allows such constitutional and statutory discrimination.  The 
solution is just as easily identifiable: the chain must be 
broken.  And Puerto Ricans must break it under international 
law, not Congress unilaterally or the Court under American 
constitutional law.  
 
 
discussion within the PDP to propose still another internal referendum, this 
time to ask Puerto Ricans whether they want statehood, anticipating that a 
majority would answer no to that question.  None of these plebiscites mean 
anything because none have ever been sanctioned by either Congress or 
international bodies, and neither the NPP nor the PDP have taken political 
action based on their results. 
225 The Resident Commissioner can vote in House committees, but 
not for the approval of the final legislation.  Rules of the House of 
Representatives, 114th Cong., Rule III, § 675 (2015). 
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 Since I too hold some truths to be self-evident, no 
extensive discussion is warranted here to explain why Puerto 
Rico is sociologically a nation.226  It is “a nation without its 
own sovereign state,”227 but a nation nonetheless.  “More to 
the point, it may be described as a nation in a relationship of 
political subordination to a metropolitan state.”228  In other 
words, Puerto Rico is Cuba, not Guantánamo Bay Naval Base.  
The time has come for the Court to acknowledge this 
sociological reality so that the correct legal conclusions can 
finally follow logically from the annals of the United States 
Reports.229 
 
226 On this topic, I must again defer to Professor Rivera Ramos, who 
addressed it as follows: 
 
Nations do not have essences, in the sense of 
immutable constitutive traits. Nation is rather a 
sociocultural construct used to refer to certain 
collective phenomena, which usually consist of 
groups or communities of people with perceptible 
common characteristics and a sense among its 
members of belonging to the collectivity. Beyond 
that basic notion, there may be great 
disagreement over the nature of the common 
elements necessary for a nation to be said to exist. 
There may also be discrepancies regarding the 
weight that should be accorded to so-called 
objective and subjective criteria. The debate may 
be of an academic nature. But, as the case of 
Puerto Rico shows, it is also a political polemic in 
which participants take positions influenced by 
their preferred visions of the community’s future.  
 
RIVERA RAMOS, supra note 66, at 11 (internal citations omitted).  
227 Id. at 13.  
228 Id. 
229 On August 13, 2016, Puerto Rican tennis player Mónica Puig 
gave the Island its first-ever Olympic gold medal.  Each victory she obtained 
in Río was followed closely and celebrated in Puerto Rico as a national 
holiday in and of itself.  Immediately after winning her championship 
match, Puig stated as follows: “I think I united a nation.”  Puerto Ricans of 
all walks of life rejoiced that night.  Later, thousands of Puerto Ricans filled 
the streets to welcome her at the airport upon her arrival and many more 
thousands skipped their jobs on a Tuesday to attend the official celebration 
prepared by the Government.  Such a reaction to Puerto Rican athletic 
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Because this is so, the People of Puerto Rico must 
freely exercise their right to self-determination under the 
United Nations’ Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960 (Resolution 
1514(XV)).230  Puerto Ricans must do what Spain and the 
United States have never legally allowed us to do and what 
 
performances, a cultural phenomenon that is not new in Puerto Rico, is best 
understood as a consequence of our collective need to affirm ourselves as a 
nation.  See Sandra Lilley, “This is for Them”: Monica Puig Wins Puerto 
Rico’s 1st Olympic Gold, NBC NEWS (Aug. 12, 2016, 7:58 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/them-monica-puig-wins-puerto-rico-
s-1st-olympic-gold-n630156 [https://perma.cc/GM2Z-5LNN]; Lee Moran, 
Puerto Rico Loses it As Monica Puig Wins Island’s First-Ever Olympic Gold, 
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2016, 4:36 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/monica-puig-puerto-rico-
picapower_us_57b01d95e4b007c36e4f09d2 [https://perma.cc/62DE-6XFC].  
It is fair to say that Puerto Ricans’ response had to do more with 
sociology and politics than sports, especially because of remarks made 
during the Olympics by a former tennis player born and raised in Puerto 
Rico, Beatriz “Gigi” Fernández, about the Island’s choice of flag-bearer, a 
black man born in the Dominican Republic.  Fernández drew attention to 
herself by suggesting that those who criticized her decision to represent the 
United States in Barcelona 1992 and Atlanta 1996 instead of Puerto Rico 
were hypocrites if they supported Puerto Rico’s flag bearer.  Fernández won 
Olympic gold for the United States in women’s doubles twice alongside Mary 
Joe Fernández, herself born in the Dominican Republic.  She was heavily 
criticized for her decision not to represent Puerto Rico.  Regardless of what 
one thinks about this issue, its relevance for purposes of this Article is that 
it illustrates how the status question affects almost all aspects of Puerto 
Rican society and supports the notion that most Puerto Ricans, including 
those who favor statehood, conceive themselves, both consciously and 
subconsciously, as something other than Americans. 
230 Eighty-nine nations voted in favor of Resolution 1514(XV) on 
December 14, 1960, none voted against, and nine abstained: Australia, 
Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, Union of South 
Africa, United Kingdom, and United States.  Except for the Dominican 
Republic, then under the right-wing dictatorship of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo 
Molina, the rest of those countries that abstained were major colonial 
powers, including the United States. UNITED NATIONS, YEARBOOK OF THE 
UNTIED NATIONS, 1960, 49–50 (1961).  See also Letter from President 
Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan (Dec. 10, 1960), in Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Western Europe, Vol. 8, Pt. 2, 
Document 384 (1993), 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v07p2/d384 
[https://perma.cc7ENU-R37T].  
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Commonwealth supporters incorrectly believed that 
happened in 1952: freely decide our future as a political 
community based on the [S]overeignty that we do possess as 
a nation but which has been legally denied for centuries.  
Congress’s role, then, should be limited to determining 
whether it will really accept Puerto Ricans’ will if we vote in 
favor of becoming a state of the Union or instead immediately 
recognize the Puerto Rican People’s national sovereignty 
under international law.  Whether that sovereignty is then 
employed to remain an independent country, as that term is 
ordinarily understood, or to reach a truly sovereign economic 
or political agreement between two nations, through an 
internationally-recognized treaty binding on both parties, is a 
matter for Puerto Ricans to decide later and for the United 
States to ponder if the latter is preferred.  
 
 But what can the Court do in the meantime, if 
anything?  As stated above, it should attempt to move the law 
closer to sociological reality.  It must recognize that Puerto 
Rico is a nation and that Puerto Ricans must decide their 
future, not Congress alone; that it was the Executive that 
unilaterally took control of the island; that it was Congress 
that unilaterally made Puerto Ricans American citizens; that 
it was the Court itself that invented the “unincorporated 
territory” in order to justify Congress’s plenary (colonial) 
powers over “Porto Rico” and “its inhabitants”; and that 
Puerto Ricans have never consented to such ridiculous 
treatment.  Thus, the Court must finally revisit the Insular 
Cases.  
 
 A harder question is what the Court should replace the 
Insular Cases with.  Here, perhaps like on the national 
element, I part ways with statehood supporters like district 
Judge Gelpí and circuit Judge Torruella, to whom the answer 
is simple: treat Puerto Ricans “equally” to Americans by fully 
applying the Constitution.  They have advocated for this 
“solution” in several ways, one of which is overruling the 
Insular Cases or at least modifying them to declare Puerto 
Rico an “incorporated” territory, something that many 
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commentators see as nothing more than a judicially-
sanctioned path to statehood, in part because there has never 
been an incorporated territory that has not become a state.231  
In Franklin California Tax Free-Trust, Torruella also 
suggested that different treatment towards Puerto Rico 
should be subjected to some form of heightened scrutiny.232 
 
Though I share their sentiment that the full 
application of the American Constitution in Puerto Rico is 
preferable to the who-knows-what-applies situation currently 
in place, under which the United States government both 
exercises its proclaimed sovereignty while it denies people 
who it determined were American citizens the full rights of 
the Federal Constitution, I believe the Court should decline 
such invitations.  Their approach fails to acknowledge that 
many Puerto Ricans do not see themselves as Americans, nor 
do they want to.  Thus, judicial “incorporation” in order to 
bring “equality” (again, with Americans) conveniently ignores 
that many Puerto Ricans want, just as fervently, “equality” 
(with the rest of the nations of the world, including the United 
States itself).  Thus, the reasoning is as problematic as that of 
many liberals in Congress who see PROMESA as a way to 
help Puerto Rico, ignoring the fact that no political party on 
the island supported that measure because the creation of a 
small, undemocratic Junta over the Puerto Rican people is an 
insult.  Like all the Justices in the Insular Cases, these 
proponents do not really take issue with the validation of the 
exercise of American sovereignty over Puerto Rico through a 
treaty in which Puerto Ricans never participated; they simply 
 
231 See Consejo de Salud Playa de Ponce v. Rullan, 586 F. Supp. 2d 
22 (D. P.R. 2008) (holding that, in view of the historical relationship 
between the United States and Puerto Rico, the latter has become an 
incorporated territory); but see Igartúa-De la Rosa v. United States, 417 
F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (rejecting such a view over Torruella’s 
dissent).  See also Saavedra Gutiérrez, supra note 66 (advocating for the 
same). 
232 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 805 F.3d at 354 (Torruella, J., 
concurring). 
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would have sided with the initial minority that would have 
applied the Constitution in its entirety.   
 
Why such an approach would be less colonial in nature 
is beyond me.  Differentiation is not discrimination.  The 
problem with the Insular Cases is the legal subordination of 
Puerto Rico, not its recognition as something other than the 
United States; 500 years of history show that it is.  To suggest 
that equality within the Union is the only way to treat Puerto 
Ricans with dignity under the law, and that courts should 
decide so, is disrespectful to the collective right of the Puerto 
Rican people to determine their future as a political 
community.  Even Puerto Ricans who see themselves as 
Americans and would like the island to be the fifty-first state 
should not favor the imposition of a law to which Puerto 
Ricans never consented.  Just like independence advocates 
should not try to infuse the non-sovereign Commonwealth 
with attributes of sovereignty that it clearly never had just to 
play republic, neither should statehood advocates just to feel 
they are in a state of the Union.  Regardless, after the October 
2015 Term, attempts to constitutionally equate Puerto Rico 
with states, either because of the passage of time or otherwise, 
seem less likely to succeed than ever before.  As Justice Kagan 
eloquently stated for the Court, “there is no getting away from 
the past.”233 
 
Instead of moving the Court to judicially “incorporate” 
Puerto Rico more and more, I would instead suggest a much 
more modest approach if it ever revisits the Insular Cases.  
Besides dropping the euphemistic historical account 
unfortunately reiterated by the Court in Sánchez Valle, the 
Court should acknowledge that most of what was said in the 
Insular Cases is not really constitutionally-mandated, but 
invented at a time when the Court’s members could not see 
beyond their bigoted ideas of American superiority and White 
supremacy.  No deference should be given to those holdings.  
Whether an avowed originalist or a critic, no Justice should 
 
233 Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1876. 
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feel compelled to follow that doctrine, just like none would rely 
on Dred Scott’s or Plessy’s rationale or statements.  
 
The Court should use its newly-found flexibility in 
order to address responsibly the complexity of trying to apply 
American law, both constitutional and statutory, to a 
jurisdiction whose members, whether Americans or not, have 
never consented to it; and especially consider whether it 
should have power to do impose it at all.  It should not.  
 
Unfortunately, fashioning a judicial remedy to this 
court-created conundrum is difficult.  The Puerto Rican in me 
would ask the Court to invalidate everything pursuant to 
international law or American constitutional principles (Pub. 
Law 600 and the territorial Commonwealth; the Jones Act of 
1917; the Foraker Act of 1900; and the Treaty of Paris of 1898 
itself), under the basic principle that the United States cannot 
acquire nations without their consent and treat their people 
as second-class citizens for over one hundred years.  On the 
other hand, the lawyer in me cannot find a more non-
justiciable political question than the one considered in this 
Article.  
 
There may be alternatives for the short term, but not 
very good ones.  The Court could, for instance, expressly adopt 
some Chevron-like deference with regard to cases coming from 
Commonwealth courts.234  At least Commonwealth judges are 
appointed and confirmed by persons elected by Puerto Ricans.  
In fact, the Court had granted so few cases from Puerto Rico 
over the last sixty years that one wonders whether it had 
already internally adopted such an approach.  
 
But what to do with to the United States District Court 
for the District of Puerto Rico, whose judges are appointed by 
a President, and confirmed by Senators, the Puerto Rican 
 
234 See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(holding that courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of 
an ambiguous statute).
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people do not vote for? And even if their decisions were not 
reviewable, should Commonwealth judges have to apply 
federal law, either constitutional or statutory, even though 
Puerto Ricans do not participate in the federal (“national,” 
from an American perspective) political process?  There is 
simply no way around it.  Unless the Court rules that the 
United States government cannot exercise its unilaterally 
proclaimed sovereignty over Puerto Rico anymore, the 
solution must be political in nature.  The Court should at least 
assure that the decision not be taken for the Puerto Rican 
People through a court of law, whether federal or territorial.  
 
As a result of the island’s territorial status and its 
validation through the Insular Cases, questions of the utmost 
importance will continue to be addressed and answered by 
courts, and then undemocratically applied to Puerto Rico 
without its People’s consent or participation in the political 
arena.  The most contentious questions in the United States, 
such as those dealing with abortion, gay marriage, campaign 
finance regulations, gun control, among many others, have 
already been answered for Puerto Ricans.  Whatever 
federalism concerns are usually involved in those cases, they 
are minimal compared to the problems that their imposition 
creates in Puerto Rico, regardless of whether one likes the 
particular outcome or not.  In Puerto Rico, they are not 




 The October 2015 Term will go down in history as the 
most significant one for Puerto Rico-United States relations 
in more than a century.  The United States Supreme Court 
opted to address the issues presented in a constitutional case 
arising from the Commonwealth courts and a statutory case 
arising from the United States District Court for the District 
of Puerto Rico, the answer to which directly related to one’s 
understanding of the nature of the political status between 
both nations.  In doing so, the Court set in motion a series of 
unprecedented actions that illustrate, now more clearly than 
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ever, why Puerto Rico legally remains a 21st century colony of 
the United States.  
 
 Unless Puerto Rico exercises its right to self-
determination under international law through a process that 
legally forces the United States government to either allow 
Puerto Ricans to decide whether they wish to become a state 
of the Union or recognize Puerto Rico’s full national 
sovereignty—completely removing the island from Congress’s 
plenary powers under the territorial clause of the 
Constitution—both Commonwealth and federal courts will 
struggle to define how to apply American constitutional 
principles to a jurisdiction whose members have not even 
decided whether they are Americans at all.  Until that day 
comes, attempts to reconcile Puerto Rico’s sociological reality 
with American federalism principles will continue to erode 
both American constitutionalism and the Puerto Rican 
People’s right to decide their political destiny on their own, 
solidifying America’s century-old constitutional colonialism 
over Puerto Rico.  
 
 Because it was the United States Supreme Court that 
invented the doctrine that unabashedly justified the legal 
discriminatory treatment of Puerto Rico while granting 
unlimited political power to Congress without questioning the 
legitimacy of American rule over the island in the Insular 
Cases, the Court should revisit this doctrine sometime in the 
future.  When it does, however, it will have to deal with the 
repercussions of trying to decide legal questions that will 
produce obvious political repercussions over the Puerto Rican 
people.  Whatever decision the Court ultimately makes to 
overturn one of the most shameful doctrines it has ever 
developed, it should be mindful that every single 
constitutional and statutory interpretation that it reaches 
based on American law will unavoidably constitute yet 
another act of colonialism when applied to a nation whose 
members have been denied participation and representation 
in the federation’s and in the international community’s 
political bodies. 
